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INTRODUCTION
The limited liability' of corporate shareholders is one of the
most controversial issues in corporate law. Many lawyers, judges,
and academics believe that limited liability is a privilege conferred
by the state as a result of the act of incorporating or forming some
other type of limited liability business.2 Some object to this privi-
lege as unfair to creditors and an invitation to reckless behavior by
those doing business in limited liability firms.'
1. One who has "limited liability," as the term is used in this Article, risks liability
for debts only up to a predetermined sum, usually the party's investment in the business.
"Personal liability" refers to a rule by which a party is liable to business creditors to the
full extent of her assets, limited only by the dischargeability of debts in bankruptcy. See,
e.g., Ribstein, An Applied Theory of Limited Partnership, 37 EMORY L.J. 835, 841 (1988) [here-
inafter Applied Theory].
2. See, e.g., Solomon & Collins, Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the Corporate
Social Responsibility Debate, 12J. CORP. L. 331, 338 (1987).
3. See, e.g., Diamond, Corporate Personality and Limited Liability, in LIMITED LIABILITY
AND THE CORPORATION 22, 42 (T. Orhnial ed. 1983) ("Were Parliament to set about
devising means for the encouragement of speculation, over-trading and swindling, what
better could it do?" (quotingJ.R. McColluch, first professor of political economy in the
University of London, 1859)); Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of
Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 148 (1980) ("[I]n the case of
small, tightly held companies, a limited liability regime will, in many cases, create incen-
tives for owners to exploit a moral hazard and transfer uncompensated business risks to
creditors .... "); Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1143, 1172-80
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More recently, a benign or even productive view of limited lia-
bility has emerged from the contractual theory of the corporation.4
Limited liability can be regarded as a term of the contract among
shareholders and creditors 5 which is wealth-maximizing for both
creditors and owners.6 Indeed, one group of commentators has ar-
gued that legal rules providing for limited liability, far from confer-
ring a privilege, are "irrelevant" because the parties can contract for
limited liability.7
This Article rejects the conception of limited liability as a state-
conferred privilege. It makes the following general points: First,
contracts for limited liability should be broadly enforced even if the
parties have not complied with formalities such as incorporation.
(1989) (policy of limited liability suggests that the risk of business failure of an incorpo-
rated business is placed on the corporation's creditors).
4. Commentary reflecting this contractual theory includes R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE
OF THE CORPORATION (1979); N. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION: FREE MARKETS
VERSUS REGULATION (1984); Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial En-
trenchment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REV. 1257 (1985); Butler,
The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 99 (1989); Butler &
Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation, 55 BROOKLYN L. REV. 767 (1989) [herein-
after Contract Clause]; Butler & Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the
Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Opting Out]; Butler & Ribstein,
State Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Contract Clause, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 611 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter Anti-Takeover]; Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259
(1982); Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender
Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701 (1987); Klein, The Modern Businew Organization: Bargaining Under
Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982); Ribstein, Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract,
78 GEO. LJ. 71 (1989); Ribstein, Applied Theory, supra note 1, at 835.
Some of the major contributions on the economics of the firm, which are relied on
in the legal literature, include Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
nomic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the
Finn, 26J. L. & ECON. 1 (1983); Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937);
Fama &Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983);Jensen &
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents,
and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21J. L. & ECON. 297 (1978); Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); Manne, Our Two Corporation
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967) [hereinafter Our Two Corporation
Systems]; Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22
J. L. & ECON. 233 (1979).
5. For early recognition of this point, see Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Individual
Liability for Corporation Debts, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 285, 296 (1909).
6. See R. HESSEN, supra note 4, at 17-18; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
269-72 (3d ed. 1986); Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11J. CORP. L. 573,
615-16 (1986); Easterbrook & Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L.
REV. 89, 89 (1985); Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 3, at 144; Manne, Our
Two Corporation Systems, supra note 4, at 262-63; Woodward, Limited Liability in the Theory of
the Firm, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON., 601, 602-06 (1985).
7. See Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 351, 364 (1979).
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Second, the positive law largely reflects this contractual approach to
limited liability. Third, recognition of limited liability as the prod-
uct of private ordering compels acceptance of the contract theory of
the corporation.
This Article extends existing literature by looking beyond the
efficiency of limited liability to how limited liability contracts are cre-
ated in both corporate and noncorporate settings. The existing
literature mostly identifies limited liability with incorporation or
other formal state filings.8 Such filings certainly should not be abol-
ished because they provide an inexpensive way of agreeing with
creditors that the latter may look for payment only to the assets of
the firm. But there is no economic justification for making filing a
necessary prerequisite to acquiring limited liability protection.
Recognizing that incorporation or other formalities are not pre-
requisites to obtaining the protection of limited liability has broad
theoretical and practical implications. From a theoretical stand-
point, it demonstrates convincingly the contractual nature of the
corporation. It is already widely accepted that other "corporate"
characteristics, including perpetual life, centralized management,
and transferability of shares, are available by private contract. 9
Once it is recognized that state action is unnecessary to create lim-
ited liability, there is nothing left of the idea that incorporation is a
state-conferred "privilege." From a practical standpoint, if incorpo-
ration or other formal filings are unnecessary for limited liability,
this would make it more difficult for the states to regulate the terms
of business associations than if the firm is regarded as the "product"
of state law.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the role of lim-
ited liability in the regulatory theory of the corporation. This Part
shows how regulation of corporate governance is linked both histor-
ically and practically with the rule that a state filing is a prerequisite
for limited liability.
Parts II and III establish that there are no efficiency-based rea-
sons for regulation of limited liability in cases involving voluntary
creditors. Part II shows that limited liability contracts generally are
efficient across the spectrum of limited liability firms, including
closely held firms. Thus, there is no economic justification for re-
stricting the availability of limited liability to particular types of
8. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 90 (while noting that "[I]imited
liability is not unique to corporations," the authors focus their discussion on the corpo-
rate setting).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 36-43.
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firms. Part III shows that formal incorporation, while often useful as
a transaction-cost-saving device, should not be a mandatory prereq-
uisite to limited liability. The implication of Parts II and III is that
mandating formalities as necessary prerequisites for limited liability
can be explained only as the assertion of state power to assist legis-
lative rent-seeking. Since these prerequisites are unjustified, they
should be abolished.
Part IV analyzes the law regarding informal limited liability. It
shows that informal limited liability in cases of voluntary dealings
with creditors is firmly entrenched in the law, and that the few ex-
isting constraints on the availability of limited liability by contract
are mostly consistent with the contractual theory of the corporation.
Finally, Part V shows that there is no efficiency-based justifica-
tion for a filing requirement in the case of involuntary creditors.
Thus, even here limited liability cannot properly be regarded as a
state-conferred privilege.
I. LIMITED LIABILITY AND THE REGULATORY THEORY
OF THE CORPORATION
At first blush, legal restrictions on limited liability seem trivial:
formal incorporation is cheap and easy and in some cases beneficial.
But these restrictions are important because they lie at the heart of
the debate over the nature of the corporation.
Contractarians view the corporation as a set of contracts be-
tween the participants in the business, including shareholders, man-
agers, creditors, employees, and others.'" The terms of the
corporate contract may be provided by customized agreements or
by standard forms provided by state case and statutory law that the
parties can draft around or avoid by selecting the state of
incorporation.
Advocates of the regulatory theory of the corporation, on the
other hand, argue that the terms of corporate contracts should be
regulated more extensively than those of "ordinary" contracts."
10. For commentary discussing the contract theory of the corporation, see supra note
4.
11. For examples of anti-contractarian commentary, see generally Brudney, Corporate
Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Clark,
Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BusI-
NESS (J. Pratt & R. Zeckhauser eds. 1985); Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual
Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 919 (1988).
Other examples include the following papers presented at the Columbia University Law
and Economics Center Conference on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, Decem-
ber 9-10, 1988: Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Con-
[VOL. 50:80
1991] LIMrrED LIABILITY 85
This Part shows how the requirement of a state filing as a prerequi-
site for limited liability is a significant basis of the regulatory theory
of the corporation.
A. The Concession Origins of the Filing Requirement
The regulatory view is based to a significant extent upon the so-
called "concession" theory-that is, the theory that corporations are
creatures or concessions of the state rather than wholly the product
of private contract. This theory is reflected in Chief Justice Mar-
shall's famous description of the corporation in Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward 12 as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of [state] law."'" Early corporations
were, indeed, state-created franchises. Later, corporations contin-
ued to be created by special legislative acts that preserved the image
of state creation.14
Special chartering gradually was replaced by incorporation
under general incorporation laws.' 5 Under these laws, the state fil-
ing that technically created the corporation came to be a largely
ministerial act rather than something that connoted state "permis-
sion." The corporation no longer could be regarded as the product
straints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989); Clark, Contracts, Elites, and
Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1703 (1989) [hereinafter
Contracts]; Coffee, The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial
Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989) [hereinafter Mandatory/Enabling]; Eisenberg, The
Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989); Gordon, The Mandatory Struc-
ture of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989); Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts
Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook & Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449
(1989).
For articles advocating limiting the private ordering of corporate manager duties,
see Anderson, Conflicts of Interests: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L.
REV. 738 (1978); Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Stan-
dard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (1988); DeMott,
Beyond Metaphor An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE LJ. 879; Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983).
For commentary criticizing the anti-contractarians, see Black, Is Corporate Law Triv-
ial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 568-70 (1989); Butler & Ribstein,
Opting Out, supra note 4; Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416 (1989); McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of
Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530 (1989); Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The
Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599 (1989).
12. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
13. Id. at 636.
14. See Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate
Privileges, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 143-46 (1985).
15. This history is traced in Butler, id. See also Butler, General Incorporation in Nine-
teenth Century England: Interaction of Common Law and Legislative Processes, 6 INT'L REV. LAW
& ECON. 169 (1986) [hereinafter England].
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of state permission or concession.' 6
Although state creation is an historical relic, the concession
view of the corporation continues to influence corporate law. For
example, the Supreme Court recently repeated the Dartmouth College
"creature" dictum quoted above.' 7 The Court also upheld against a
first amendment challenge a state law that prohibited corporations
(but not other types of firms) from making certain political expendi-
tures. 8 The Court justified singling out corporations partly on the
basis of the "unique state-conferred corporate structure that facili-
tates the amassing of large treasuries."' 9 The Court referred to lim-
ited liability as one of these special state-conferred corporate
advantages.2 °
The most important remnant of the concession theory is un-
doubtedly the continued requirement of a state filing.2' While no
one today would argue that filing is tantamount to an application for
"permission" to incorporate, the filing appears to involve the state
in the incorporation process to a greater extent than it is involved in
the formation of other contracts. Some have argued that the long
survival of a rule of state involvement in the creation of the corpora-
tion lends some normative support to such state involvement.22
Concession-based arguments for regulation of the corporation
depend, therefore, on the filing requirement. As will be shown, lim-
16. For recent recognition of this point, see Bratton, The "Nexus of Contracts" Corpora-
tion: A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 435-36 (1989).
17. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
18. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1990). But see
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256 (1986).
19. 110 S. Ct. at 1398. Along similar lines, the Court has held that corporations, by
accepting special privileges, submit to the state's "visitatorial" power to compel produc-
tion of incriminating documents. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911); see
also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906).
20. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397. Whether there are other reasons for denying certain
types of firms first amendment rights, such as the fact that agents representing these
firms do not represent the shareholders, is beyond the scope of this Article. The point
here is only that regulation of corporations cannot be justified under the Constitution
on the ground that corporations receive "privileges" from the state.
21. See Bratton, supra note 16, at 445 (arguing that corporate formalities represent
"[t]races of concession theory"; although the parties easily can comply, the formalities
caution the parties that they act subject to the threat of state constraint).
22. See Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1493 (1989).
Apart from the filing requirement, the state "creates" the corporation in the addi-
tional sense that state courts and other agencies recognize and enforce corporate fea-
tures. But this is no different from state recognition and enforcement of any contract.
Thus, it is the state filing that seemingly justifies greater state involvement in corpora-
tions than in other types of contracts.
[VOL. 50:80
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ited liability is the single corporate feature for which filing arguably
does remain a requirement. 3
B. The Filing Requirement as Facilitating Regulation
The continued requirement of a state filing is more than merely
a symbolic holdover of the "concession" theory. The filing require-
ment gives the state control over the corporate terms of firms that
comply with the filing.24 Any firm that files as a "corporation" is
subject to all state rules applying to corporations, such as limitations
on the form of management2 5 or on opting out of fiduciary duties. 26
In other words, firms that want corporate features must accept the
limitations on contracting that come with the filing.
States could regulate the terms of the corporate contract by ex-
pressly requiring or forbidding certain contract terms even if firms
did not have to file in order to obtain corporate features. But the
states would have to define the contracts to which such regulations
would apply. It would no longer be enough simply to apply the reg-
ulation to "corporations," because without the filing requirement
firms would not have to identify themselves as corporations. 27 Per-
haps the regulation could be applied to all "limited liability" firms.
But that would not necessarily cover all variations on limited liabil-
23. See infra subpart IC.
24. The filing requirement may also facilitate noncorporate tax and regulatory provi-
sions applying to corporations that may be justified even under the contractual theory of
the firm. Among other things, the filing requirement arguably helps provide a mecha-
nism for collecting taxes and for identifying agents of firms who are charged with statu-
tory duties. Full explication of this justification would require a detailed survey of the
myriad contexts to which the filing requirement would relate, and accordingly is beyond
the scope of this Article. It is enough to note at this point that statutes could be crafted
to identify the objects of taxation and regulation without mandating filing.
25. For example, in some states corporations may not dispense with or unduly limit
the functions of the board of directors. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw. § 620(b) (West
1968) (prescribing circumstances in which director-control agreements are valid).
26. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1988) (providing certificate of incor-
poration may contain provision limiting the personal liability of a director or stock-
holder of the corporation for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty in certain
situations).
27. The difficulty of defining "corporation" is demonstrated by the difficulty in the
tax context of distinguishing firms that should be taxed as partnerships from those that
should be taxed as corporations. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2), (3) (1988); Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2 (1990); Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976). The definitional
problem is illustrated similarly in the context of federal securities regulations, which
apply only to transactions involving the sale of a "security." See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(1),
78c(a)(10) (1988). The broad statutory definition of this term has given rise to an exten-
sive body of case law.
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ity, or companies that have limited liability with respect to only
some of their creditors.
The filing requirement facilitates state manipulation as well as
limitation of the corporate contract. State corporation statutes com-
monly give the legislature the "reserved power" to enact amend-
ments that retroactively alter the charter.2" This leaves filing firms
at the mercy of post-filing legislative changes.2 9 Recent anti-take-
over legislation shows that legislators are willing and able to use
their retroactive amendment power opportunistically to make
changes that benefit managers at the expense of the shareholders.3"
The reserved power is a limited exception from the contract
clause that applies only to corporations. It is based on Justice
Story's concurring dictum in Dartmouth College that "rights legally
vested in a corporation, cannot be controled or destroyed by any
subsequent statute, unless a power for that purpose be reserved to the legis-
lature in the act of incorporation."'" Firms that obtain limited liability or
other corporate features without incorporating are not subject to
the reserved power and thus are protected by the contract clause
from legislation that changes the terms of existing contracts.
The states might try to preserve their power to limit or manipu-
late the corporate contract by enacting statutes that apply to firms
with corporate features whether or not they are incorporated.
Again, this would present the problem of identifying which firms
these statutes should govern. Moreover, the reserved power excep-
tion to the contract clause assumes that the corporation derives
rights from the state. Without even a pretense of state involvement
in the incorporation process, the state lacks a rationale for exercis-
28. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 394 (1983). For discussions of the reserved
power and questions concerning its constitutionality, see Butler & Ribstein, Contract
Clause, supra note 4, at 782-91; Butler & Ribstein, Anti-Takeover, supra note 4, at 632-34.
29. See Bratton, supra note 16, at 445 (corporate formalities remind the parties that
the state "reserves the right to rewrite the ground rules").
30. See Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti- Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Con-
trol, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 365, 373-77; Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73
VA. L. REV. 111, 113-17 (1987). Such legislative acts may be unconstitutional under the
contract clause. See Butler & Ribstein, Contract Clause, supra note 4, at 794 -808; Butler &
Ribstein, Anti-Takeover, supra note 4, at 642-45.
31. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 708 (1819) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). For
applications, see Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46, 51-52 (1900); Miller v. State, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 478, 493-94 (1872); Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. McGowin, 271 Ala. 414,
424, 124 So. 2d 812, 821 (1960); Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 38 Del. Ch.
514, 521, 154 A.2d 893, 897 (1959); Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157,
161, 142 A. 654, 656 (1928); Adair v. Orrell's Mut. Burial Ass'n, Inc., 284 N.C. 534, 538,
201 S.E.2d 905, 908 (1974).
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ing a reserved power.3 2
In summary, from a practical as well as an historical standpoint,
the regulatory theory of the corporation significantly depends on
the filing requirement and ultimately must fail if, as shown below,
the filing requirement is shown to be without basis.
C. Limited Liability and the Filing Requirement
The need to comply with the filing requirement technically ap-
plies to all features that are available only to "corporations." But
limited liability is now the only feature commonly identified with
"corporateness" that is not clearly available to noncorporations.
A fair approximation of corporate features can be derived from
the tax definition of "association,", 31 which is the mechanism for dis-
tinguishing firms that should be taxed as partnerships from those
that should be taxed as corporations.34 The so-called "Kintner reg-
ulations," which govern on this issue, identify four characteristics
that distinguish corporations and partnerships: continuity of life,
centralized management, free transferability of interest, and limited
liability.35
In the partnership, the first three of these features are available
by contract. As to continuity of life, although a partnership auto-
matically dissolves upon the happening of any of several types of
events-including the disassociation of a partner from the partner-
ship by death or withdrawal 6"-section 38(1) of the Uniform Part-
32. For a critical discussion of arguments for the reserved power, see Butler & Rib-
stein, Contract Clause, supra note 4, at 782-91; Butler & Ribstein, Anti-Takeover, supra note
4, at 632-34.
33. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2), (3) (1988) (distinguishing the corporation as an asso-
ciation).
34. The tax definition recognizes that firms might want to identify themselves as
"partnerships" or "corporations" in order to obtain favorable tax treatment. Unfortu-
nately there is no clearly articulated tax policy basis for distinguishing the two business
forms. See Ribstein, Applied Theoty, supra note 4, at 871-77. For present purposes, pre-
cise tax categorization is unnecessary. The tax definition is being used only to resolve
the question of whether incorporation is necessary to obtain "corporate" features.
35. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1990). A prominent modem corporate law treatise
also cites four corporate characteristics, three of which are identified in the Kintner reg-
ulations. See R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw, § 1.1, at 2 (1986). For continuity of life Dean
Clark substitutes "legal personality," which includes continuity of life as well as other
features. But legal personality is not particularly helpful because it is more a way of
characterizing corporate features than a feature itself. For a discussion of the aggregate-
entity distinction showing that partnerships, like corporations, are regarded as entities
for many purposes, see 1 A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PART-
NERSHIP § 1.03 (1988).
36. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 29, 31, 6 U.L.A. 364, 376 (1969).
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nership Act permits the parties to draft around the nondissolving
partners' power to compel liquidation of the business.3 7 Under
such an agreement, a partner's absolute power to compel dissolu-
tion at will reduces to a power merely to withdraw and terminate the
agency relationship between the withdrawing and continuing part-
ners. This is comparable to any agent's or principal's power to ter-
minate an agency.38
Similarly, the governance rights provided for in section 18 of
the Uniform Partnership Act explicitly are made "subject to any
agreement between [the partners]." 3 9 As to centralized manage-
ment, although subsection 18(e)4 ° provides for equal participation
of partners in management, the partners can draft around this de-
fault provision and place management power in a body resembling a
corporate board.41 Moreover, the partners can provide for transfer-
ability of interests by drafting around subsection 18(g),42 which
gives each partner the power to veto admission of a new partner.43
Of all the principal "corporate" features, only limited liability is
not explicitly made available by agreement to partnerships.4 4 If in-
37. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(1) provides that the partners are entitled to compel
liquidation of the firm "unless otherwise agrecd." Id. § 38(1), 6 U.L.A. 456. For exam-
ples of cases enforcing agreements providing for continuation of the business after dis-
solution, see Hagan v. Dundore, 185 Md. 86, 43 A.2d 181 (1945); Wilzig v. Sisselman,
182 NJ. Super. 519, 442 A.2d 1021 (1982); Napoli v. Domnitch, 14 N.Y.2d 508, 248
N.Y.S.2d 228, 197 N.E.2d 623 (1964); Hunter v. Straube, 273 Or. 720, 543 P.2d 278
(1975); Adams v. Jarvis, 23 Wis. 2d 453, 127 N.W.2d 400 (1964). For a discussion of
continuation provisions in partnership agreements, see 2 A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN,
supra note 35, § 7.1 l(e).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 118 (1958).
39. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18, 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969).
40. Id. § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213.
41. See, e.g., Day v. Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908
(1977) (law firm executive committee controlled the firm's Washington office under a
partnership agreement); Bernstein, Bernstein, Wile & Gordon v. Ross, 22 Mich. App.
117, 120, 177 N.W.2d 193, 194-95 (1970) (exclusive management powers resided in
senior partners); McCallum v. Asbury, 238 Or. 257, 393 P.2d 774 (1964) (executive
committee of a medical partnership was given general management authority subject to
other partners' power to alter or cancel action taken by a majority vote); 2 A. BROMBERG
& L. RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, § 6.03, at 6:39-6:40.
42. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(g), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969).
43. See Day v. Sidley & Austin, 394 F. Supp. 986 (D.D.C. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Day v.
Avery, 548 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977) (enforcing an
agreement that provided for the admission of partners by majority vote). Purely finan-
cial interests of partners are freely assignable in the absence of contrary provision in the
agreement. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 27(1), 6 U.L.A. 353 (1969); Rapoport v. 55
Perry Co., 50 A.D.2d 54, 376 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1975). Note that, as discussed infra at text
accompanying note 82, transferability of interests, even if permitted by the agreement, is
infeasible in the absence of limited liability.
44. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1969), which provides for the part-
[VOL. 50:80
1991] LIMITED LIABILITY 91
corporation is necessary to obtain any corporate feature, this is the
one.45 It has been said:
Transferable shares and concentration of the powers of
management and a small number of necessary parties in
suits are minor advantages of incorporation. But limitation
or elimination of liability of the shareholders is not merely
the chief single advantage of a business corporation but it
is the advantage which in the estimation of legislatures and
also in the estimation of the public is of more importance
than all the other advantages put together. It is the main
thing.4
6
Thus, in order to preserve their control of corporate terms
states must constrain the parties' ability to obtain limited liability
without incorporating or making some other state filing.47
II. THE EFFICIENCY OF RESTRICTIONS ON LIMITED LIABILITY:
REGULATION OF FORM OF LIMITED LIABILITY FIRMS
In light of the argument in Part I that restrictions on limited
liability are critical to the viability of the regulatory theory of the
corporation, it is important to determine whether there is any justifi-
cation for such restrictions. Parts II and III demonstrate that there
is no economic justification for these restrictions.
Restrictions on limited liability can be explained as "rent-seek-
ing" conduct by legislators. State control over corporate terms lets
legislators benefit (in the form of campaign contributions and other
support) from interest groups that can gain from exercise of this
control.48 Historically, legislators reaped benefits by controlling the
ners' personal liability, is not subject to contrary agreement. A state filing is also re-
quired to obtain limited liability in some non-corporate firms. See infra text
accompanying notes 193-206.
45. Incorporation may be helpful in obtaining the corporate features just discussed
because the courts have tended to construe partnership agreements in the light of the
standard form, forcing partners who want corporate features to draft explicitly for them.
See, e.g., Rapoport v. 55 Perry Co., 50 A.D.2d 54, 376 N.Y.S.2d 147 (1975) (construing
an arguably ambiguous agreement against transferability of full partnership status).
Like the limited liability story being told here, this approach to contract interpretation
may be related to the regulatory theory of the corporation.
46. E. WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WrrIHouT INCORPORATION 399 (1929).
47. See infra note 186 for a discussion of historical precedent for government sup-
pression of privately contracted governance terms in order to retain state control over
the corporation.
48. See generally Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Economic Regulation, 19 J. L.
& ECON. 211 (1976); Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. ECON. 335 (1974);
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELLJ. ECON. 3 (1971). The conduct dis-
cussed here is more accurately characterized as "rent extraction" in that, by enacting
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supply of corporate charters.49 Modern legislators can earn rents by
being able to enact, for example, retroactive corporate anti-takeover
legislation that benefits corporate managers. 50  Legislative rent-
seeking generates costs while doing no more than redistributing
wealth to well-organized interest groups. Thus, rent-seeking cannot
justify restrictions on the availability of limited liability.
Even if restrictions on limited liability are the product of rent-
seeking by legislators, they might also be justified on efficiency
grounds.5 ' But Parts II and III reject two potential efficiency-based
reasons for regulating limited liability arrangements through a filing
requirement. Part II considers whether regulation of limited liabil-
ity might appropriately restrict the types of firms that can adopt this
contractual term. As discussed below in subpart A, the filing re-
quirement does, indeed, deter closely held firms from adopting lim-
ited liability. But as shown in subpart B, this deterrence is
unnecessary: limited liability can be an efficient bargain for both
owners and creditors of closely held firms. Thus, regulation of lim-
ited liability is not justified as a means of screening the types of firms
that can adopt this provision. Indeed, as discussed in subpart C, the
law apparently is moving toward lifting these restrictions on the
form of limited liability firms.
A. Constraints on Form of Closely Held Firms
A firm that submits itself to a statutory regime in order to ob-
tain limited liability pays a price in terms of accepting any
mandatory terms of the statute. The filing requirement might oper-
ate to discourage adoption of limited liability by firms for which the
mandatory terms are particularly costly. Theoretically, this regula-
corporate laws, legislators actively are creating rent-seeking opportunities rather than
merely brokering law changes instigated by interest groups. See generally McChesney,
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 101
(1987) (discussing how legislators can extract rents by threatening to regulate in order
to be paid for forbearing from regulation).
49. For discussions of rent-seeking during the special-chartering era before jurisdic-
tional competition and interest group pressure brought general incorporation laws to
England and the United States, see generally sources cited supra note 15.
50. See supra note 30.
51. The restrictions might also accomplish the purpose of ensuring a particular tax
classification for a business form. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35. See also
Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice for Doing Business?, 41 FLA. L. REV.
721, 739 (1989) ("limited liability company" statutes increase the certainty of partner-
ship tax classifications by prohibiting full transferability of interests). However, this
merely raises the question (which is beyond the scope of this Article) whether restrictive
tax rules have an efficiency justification.
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tion would be justifiable if limited liability would be wealth-redis-
tributing rather than wealth-creating for those firms.
The principal area in which this rationale appears to operate is
with respect to close corporations. Corporation statutes and case
law historically have limited the enforceability of variations on the
corporate standard form where close corporations are concerned.
Most importantly, limits have been imposed on voting agreements
that "sterilize" or remove power from the board of directors.52
These limits appear to be explicable only as disincentives to
adoption of limited liability by close corporations. No other ration-
ale stands up under scrutiny. The function of the agreements is to
combine management and control, a structure inherent in most
closely held firms. Restrictions on the agreements can hardly bene-
fit creditors because even "unsterilized" directors have legal duties
and economic incentives to act in the shareholders' interests. The
agreements conceivably might surprise incoming shareholders, who
might expect to be protected by, and to be able to be elected to, the
board. But even unsterilized close corporation board members pre-
sumably are aligned with particular shareholders or factions. More-
over, close corporation shares normally are not transferred in a
faceless market, and one buying into a close corporation is likely to
insist on disclosure of existing control agreements.
Similarly, the rule that limited partners who participate in con-
trol lose their limited liability appears to be based on the theory that
the law should regulate the governance form of firms adopting lim-
ited liability.5" The basis of the control rule has been sharply ques-
52. Early statutes absolutely required that corporations be managed by the board of
directors, and these statutes were interpreted to render unenforceable agreements that
substantially removed discretion from the board. See Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New
Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948); McQouade v. Stoneham,
263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934); Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559
(1918).
Corporation statutes also restrict other arrangements that might be made in close
corporations. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(a), (b) (1983) (requiring central fil-
ing and other rules regarding voting trusts); Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del. Ch. 371,
130 A.2d 338 (1957) (invalidating a shareholder voting agreement on the ground that it
was a non-complying voting trust). However, these provisions apply equally to public
and close corporations. Indeed, they may be even more applicable to public corpora-
tions since they serve to provide notice to incoming shareholders of control arrange-
ments in a regime of freely transferable shares. See Lehrman v. Cohen, 43 Del. Ch. 222,
222 A.2d 800 (1966) (purpose of voting trust statute is to protect against "secret, uncon-
trolled combinations of stockholders formed to acquire control of the corporation to the
possible detriment of non-participating shareholders").
53. See UNIF. LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7, 6 U.L.A. 582 (1969); REVISED UNIF. LIM-
ITED PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 303, 6 U.L.A. 307-08 (1990).
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tioned in recent years.' 4 Although the rule might be defended on
the ground that it ensures that only those who are "bonded" by the
risk of liability will participate in control, the rule does not accom-
plish this purpose because it does not prevent transfer of manage-
ment responsibilities to nonpartners. Creditors who are misled by a
limited partner's exercise of control into thinking she is a general
partner will be protected without the control rule by partnership-by-
estoppel liability under section 16 of the Uniform Partnership Act.55
The only remaining reason for the control rule is that it deters
firms in which control and management are not separated from se-
lecting the limited liability form.56 The basic policy question
whether the law should deter certain firms from selecting limited
liability by means of the incorporation requirement is discussed
next.
B. An Effiiency Analysts of Constraints on Form
This subpart shows that constraints on the availability of limited
liability are unjustified because limited liability can be an efficient
bargain in close as well as public corporations.
Prior explanations of limited liability have focused on public
corporations. 7 This suggests that the benefits of limited liability to
closely held firms and corporate groups are insufficient to cover
their increased cost of credit. If so, such firms will adopt limited
liability only when they can externalize the costs of limited liability.
In effect, under this externalities hypothesis, the legal rule permit-
ting firms to adopt limited liability forces creditors to subsidize risky
firms.5" The policy implication is that closely held firms should be
blocked or deterred from adopting limited liability.
54. See Basile, Limited Liability for Limited Partners: An Argument for the Abolition of the
Control Rule, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1985); Ribstein, Applied Theoy, supra note 4, at 882-
86.
55. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 16, 6 U.L.A. 195 (1969).
56. This basis of the control rule is defended in Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1182-83.
57. It has been argued that this application of limited liability is trivial, because it is
not even clear that public shareholders would have sufficient control to be principals or
partners in the absence of limited liability. See generally R. HESSEN, supra note 4.
58. See Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1178-79. For related arguments that the state
should not permit variation of the corporate form to suit small businesses, see generally
Fessler, The Fate of Closely Held Business Associations: The Debatable Wisdom of "Incorporation,"
13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 473 (1980).
Mitchell suggests, somewhat inconsistently, that limited liability burdens closely
held firms because trade creditors will charge them high credit rates to reflect their diffi-
culty in obtaining information. Mitchell, supra note 3, at 1176-77. This is puzzling be-
cause the firms themselves obviously do not have to accept limited liability. Perhaps
Mitchell is suggesting that firms incorporate to obtain other corporate features and find
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There is no obvious reason why limited liability could result in
externalization of risk in contract cases. Whether dealing with
closely or publicly held firms, creditors who are not fully informed
as to the risks they are taking can always adjust their cost of credit to
reflect the lack of information. Indeed, closely held firms generally
are less able than public firms to extract monopoly rents by means
of uncompensated risk-shifting.
This subpart refutes the externalities argument circumstantially
by identifying the benefits of limited liability and showing how both
publicly and closely held firms might gain enough from limited lia-
bility to offset increased credit costs. To show how limited liability
can be an efficient bargain, it is necessary to begin with the default
rule of personal liability of principals and partners.59 The following
section explains why parties would seek to contract around this
default.6"
1. The Default Contract: Personal Liability.-Under what circum-
stances may party P who does not deal directly with creditor T but
who has contracted with A be held liable to T? Most obviously, P is
liable where A, with P's express or implied authority, explicitly deals
with T as P's agent. This liability is based on a contract between P
and T in the sense that both parties expect P to be bound.
Agency can be viewed as a "standard form" or "default" posi-
tion that the law supplies in certain situations where the parties have
not clearly contracted otherwise. The standard form fills in the con-
tract if T is aware of P's affiliation with A, or believes that A is not
acting solely for its own interest, even if A does not act explicitly as
P's agent. For example, in Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc. ,61 the plain-
tiff entered into a contract for dancing lessons. Although the plain-
tiff dealt with Burkin, the defendant's franchisee, the contract was
with "Arthur Murray School of Dancing," which did not exist as a
separate organization.62 The court held that the defendant was
it expensive to opt out of limited liability. But this is inconsistent with the usual descrip-
tion of close corporations as firms with partnership features.
59. Limited liability could be regarded as the default contract where the party to be
charged would not be a principal or a partner even in the absence of incorporation or
other limited liability arrangements.
60. The problem of involuntary creditors is deferred until Part V of this Article. Part
V also discusses the category of "quasi-involuntary" creditors-those, like taxi passen-
gers and product consumers, who arguably cannot be regarded as having bargained for
limited liability in any realistic sense.
61. 248 Cal. App. 2d 610, 56 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1967).
62. Id. at 612, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
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bound on the ground that there was an agency relationship between
Burkin and the defendant.
"Agency" is defined as follows:
Agency is the fiduciary relation which results from the man-
ifestation of consent by one person to another that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and
consent by the other so to act. The one for whom action is
to be taken is the principal. The one who is to act is the
agent.63
This definition includes three prerequisites for holding a per-
son liable as principal for the acts of another: (1) the acting party
must act primarily for the benefit of the party to be bound; (2) the
actor must be subject to the control of the party to be bound; and
(3) both parties must consent to the relationship. The "benefit" test
means that the principal normally is a residual claimant-that is, it
receives all net income after fixed claims are paid. "Consent" does
not require that the parties explicitly recognize that they have taken
on the benefits and burdens of agency, but only that they consent to
an arrangement that includes the legal elements of agency-that is,
benefit and control.6 4
Partnership law supplies a similar default rule of personal liabil-
ity. Section 6 of the Uniform Partnership Act defines partnership as
"an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit."65 This definition includes three elements: (1)
intent (implied in "association"); (2) the requisite form of activity
("carry[ing] on ... a business for profit"); and (3) co-ownership.
As in the law of agency, the intent element can be satisfied by
intent to do the acts, or agreement to the elements that in law con-
stitute partnership.6 6 The definition's reference to the nature of the
activity simply reflects the fact that many of the provisions of the
Uniform Partnership Act are designed for profit-making
businesses.6 7
The co-ownership element is partnership law's equivalent of
the control and benefit tests in agency. Two of the most important
elements of co-ownership are profit sharing-the only specific co-
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
64. See id. § 1 comment b.
65. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1), 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969).
66. See West v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 586 F. Supp. 493, 499 (E.D. La. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 765 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1985); 1 A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, supra note 35,
§ 2.05, at 2:36.
67. See 1 A. BROMBERG & L. RiBSTEIN, supra note 35, § 2.06.
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ownership element mentioned in the Uniform Partnership Act-and
control.6" Section 7(4) of the Uniform Partnership Act provides that
"the receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is
prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business." 69 The
commissioners' note to section 6 states: "Ownership involves the
power of ultimate control. To state that partners are co-owners of a
business is to state that each has the power of ultimate control."'70
The default personal liability imposed in both agency and part-
nership law rests on elements that relate to P's ability to monitor A.
Agency or partnership is imposed as a default rule when P's ex-
pected loss from A 's inability to perform is lower than T's.7 ' Ex-
pected loss is a function of the amount and probability of loss and
the cost of measures that will prevent the loss from occurring. If P
is a partner or principal under the tests just discussed, it can reduce
its expected loss by monitoring A-that is, exercising its control
over the agent to ensure that it does not become insolvent. More-
over, because of its position, P is well-informed about the likelihood
of loss. T, on the other hand, can reduce expected loss only by
learning about or becoming involved in managing a business in
which she currently has no role.
P's residual claim, like her control, relates to P's status as a
monitor. Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz observed in a noted
article 72 that allocating the residual claim of the firm to the monitor
ensures that the monitor will maximize its own compensation by
minimizing shirking by other "team members." It follows from this
theory that the residual claim is most efficiently allocated to the one
who holds the power to monitor the other actors in the business.73
The personal liability default position also can be explained in
68. Other elements include loss-sharing, co-ownership of property and contribu-
tions to capital. See generally 1 A. BROMBERG &L. RIBSTmN,supra note 35, §§ 2.07(d)-(e).
Note that control may be more important in determining agency than in determining
partnership because of the various partnership indicia of monitoring status other than
control, which are not typically present in agency cases. Thus, "continuous subjection
to the will of the principal" is necessary for agency, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 1 comment b (1958), while a mere right to be consulted may be enough for
partnership, see Shain Inv. Co. v. Cohen, 15 Mass. App. 4, 10, 443 N.E.2d 126, 131
(1982).
69. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7(4), 6 U.L.A. 39 (1969).
70. Id. § 6 commissioner's note, 6 U.L.A. 23.
71. See Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YAL LJ. 1231 (1984) (for an
explanation of vicarious liability that also relies to some extent on the potential for loss
avoidance by the principal).
72. Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
73. For a discussion of the relevance of the Alchian-Demsetz theory to the definition
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terms of agency cost theory. 74 In this theory, T would be the "prin-
cipal," who is exposed to loss by reason of P's (now the "agent")
decisions concerning use of the resources invested by T in firm A-P.
If P is not personally liable for A 's debts, P may cause A to use the
funds from which T is to be repaid in ways that are excessively risky
from T's standpoint. While T can reduce this risk by directly moni-
toring A 's actions, this may be more costly than giving P the incen-
tive to act consistently with T's interest. Thus, personal liability
may optimize total agency costs-that is, the total of monitoring ex-
penditures by the principal, bonding expenditures by the agent (in-
cluding personal liability for the firm's debts), and the residual
reduction in the principal's welfare that results despite these
expenditures.
Imposing default liability on monitors is consistent with the
commonly accepted theory that default provisions give parties the
terms they would have drafted if fully informed and in the absence
of transaction costs.76 T's cost of extending credit to or otherwise
dealing with the A -P business-a cost that is ultimately borne by P as
residual claimant-depends on whether P stands behind A 's debts.
If P can learn about and protect against the risk of A's insolvency
more cheaply than can T, personal liability reduces P's credit costs
more than it increases P's monitoring CoStS. 7 7
of partnership, see 1 A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, § 2.07(a), at 2:51-2:52,
2:54-2:55.
74. For other commentary suggesting an agency cost explanation for personal liabil-
ity, see Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 3, at 143 -45; Woodward, supra note
6, at 607.
75. For the seminal statement of this definition of agency costs, see Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 4, at 308.
76. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 372; Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance
Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835-36 (1985); Easterbrook & Fischel,
Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE LJ. 698, 702 (1982).
77. The standard form rule is a hypothetical bargain in the traditional sense and not
a "penalty" default under the analysis recently proposed in Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps
in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 97-100 (1989).
Under the Ayres-Gertner analysis, a contract may be incomplete not because of transac-
tion costs, but because a more informed party might take strategic advantage of the
other party. But monitoring principals do not gain strategic benefits by refusing to
come forward and bargain around the default because this would result in increased
credit costs.
Compare this to the situation in Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854), in
which a miller sued a carrier for profits lost when the carrier delayed delivery of a new
crankshaft. Ayres and Gertner conclude that the low-damage default rule is appropriate
in Hadley because millers who might suffer high consequential damages because of non-
performance by carriers might not identify themselves under a default rule that provided
for recovery of these damages. Low-damage millers might not gain enough in contract
price to justify the costs of negotiating around the high-damage rule. As a result, the
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The default rule of personal liability applies not only where T
does not explicitly contract for P's liability, but also where T explic-
itly contracts with A on the basis that P will be liable, but P has not
consented to being bound by A 's actions. In this situation, the rule
is nominally that P is bound only where he has done something to
cloak A in "apparent authority."'78  In fact, proceeding on the theory
that P is in a better position to control A's acts than T is to deter-
mine the scope of authority, the courts have gone quite far toward
holding P liable based on the appearance of authority alone. 79
2. Efficiency of Limited Liability in Public Corporations.-In light of
the preceding discussion, the limited liability contract initially seems
puzzling. Contracting for limited liability is necessary only if P
would otherwise be exposed to personal liability under the default
agency or partnership rule. But this would mean that P is a princi-
pal or partner, and therefore a monitor who can avoid the risk of A's
insolvency more cheaply than can T. In other words, in order to
explain limited liability on efficiency grounds," it is necessary to
identify benefits to P of limited liability that outweigh P's increased
cost of credit. This section states the principal efficiency rationale
for limited liability in the public corporation, while section 3 shows
how limited liability can be efficient for close corporations as well.
The principal explanation for limited liability in public firms is
that it is necessary for an efficient capital market in which share
prices quickly adjust to new information about traded firms and
therefore provide the best available unbiased estimate of future re-
turns.8 ' Limited liability is a necessary condition of market effi-
price charged by carriers would be somewhere between the high-damage and the low-
damage price. Ayres & Gertner, supra, at 101-04. This is not only a break for high-
damage millers, but leads to suboptimal precautions by carriers. In the agency setting, it
would also be inefficient if Ts bore the risk rather than monitoring Ps. But because Ts
would charge the higher price based on bearing the risk of A's default unless P negoti-
ated around, monitoring Ps would have the incentive to negotiate around the limited
liability rule unless the benefits to them of limited liability outweighed the costs.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958).
79. See Croisant v. Watrud, 248 Or. 234, 432 P.2d 799 (1967) (explicitly placing lia-
bility on this ground). This case applies the principle of "inherent agency power," de-
fined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A (1958). This is similar to apparent
authority and can arise from the general power the principal has conferred on the agent.
80. Unless otherwise noted, efficiency is used in the Pareto superiority sense; that is,
enforcement of the contract is efficient if it makes at least one party better off and does
not make any party worse off. Enforcing contracts can be assumed to be Pareto superior
if it is assumed that the contracting parties are fully informed and acting voluntarily.
Therefore, inefficiency in this sense circumstantially indicates that the parties are unin-
formed or coerced.
81. This is a rough statement of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis. The Hy-
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ciency because it facilitates free transferability of shares and pricing
of shares according to expected cash flows.
As to transferability, a personal liability regime could be en-
forced only by either restricting transfer to low-asset holders in
firms nearing insolvency or providing that liability of sellers contin-
ues despite the transfer.12 If liability continues despite the transfer,
sellers would be in the unfortunate position of having to continue
monitoring the firm after the sale. Moreover, even in solvent firms
transfer would be costly from the standpoint of both purchasing
shareholders who must determine the risk associated with their
guarantees, and the non-transferring shareholders whose exposure
depends on the wealth of the transferee.
Efficient markets cannot exist without the trading volume made
possible by free transferability of shares.8" First, efficiency depends
on frequent trading to establish a recent trade price. Second, if
stock is traded relatively infrequently, this reduces investor demand
for information about the stock and, in turn, the incentives for pro-
ducing information. As information becomes more scarce and in-
vestors must pay more for it, trading prices will convey less
information. 4
As to pricing of securities, under an unlimited liability rule what
investors will pay for securities depends partly on the cost of their
guarantee which, in turn, varies according to the investors' wealth.8 5
As a result, a given security could not have a single quoted price-a
prerequisite of an efficient market.
Market efficiency benefits publicly held firms in several ways.8 6
First, by reducing investors' information costs efficient market pric-
ing decreases a firm's cost of capital. Second, because efficient mar-
kets impound information about expected investment payoffs into
stock price, they make it easy for investors to realize expected cash
flows by selling their stock. This means that firms can pursue opti-
mal investments without being concerned about investors' individ-
pothesis is conventionally divided into three "forms," which reflect various tests of the
hypothesis: the "weak form," the "semi-strong form" and the "strong form." See Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970).
82. See Woodward, supra note 6, at 602.
83. See id. at 601-02.
84. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549 (1984).
85. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 96; Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull,
supra note 3, at 130.
86. See Ribstein, Applied Theory, supra note 4, at 845-47 for a more detailed
discussion.
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ual consumption preferences."7 Third, an efficient market provides
the essential condition of a market for control of the firm by permit-
ting purchase of control at a price reflecting the expected cash flows
under current management.8 8 The existence of this market can ben-
efit creditors as well as shareholders by reducing managers' incen-
tive to shirk or consume on the job."9
3. Efficieny of Limited Liability in Closely Held Firms.-It has been
argued that limited liability is inefficient in closely held firms be-
cause of its higher agency costs, 9° and because there is no offsetting
efficient capital market benefit. 9 However, as discussed in the fol-
lowing subsections, there are explanations for limited liability that
apply to closely held firms as well as to public firms.
a. Risk-Bearing Capability.-Imposing personal liability on
shareholders makes it costly for them to hold diversified portfolios
because each additional holding increases the potential for a disas-
trous insolvency. 92  Without diversification, owners must bear
"unique" (that is, diversifiable) risk as well as "market" (that is,
nondiversifiable) risk.93 Limited liability does not merely shift risk
from shareholders to creditors, but rather reduces the total cost of
87. See Fama & Jensen, Organization Forms and Investment Decisions, 14 J. FIN. ECON.
101, 107 (1985); Woodward, supra note 6, at 602. A related point is that, by facilitating
diversification of risk, limited liability encourages a firm's owners to make value-increas-
ing investments that would be too risky for them under an unlimited liability regime. See
also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 97.
88. Id. at 96.
89. However, the market for control can also hurt creditors to the extent that it
causes managers to increase shareholder wealth at creditors' expense.
90. For an agency cost explanation of personal liability, see supra text accompanying
notes 74-75.
91. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 3, at 148; Woodward, supra note
6, at 609.
92. See Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems, supra note 4, at 262. Richard Posner has
proposed another risk-bearing explanation for limited liability contracts: they efficiently
transfer risk to the party best able to bear them. See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 370.
Posner argues, first, that large lenders such as banks are better able to appraise business
risks than individual shareholders. Id. Second, he says that shareholders usually are
individuals who are more likely to be risk averse than corporate creditors, whose share-
holders hold diversified portfolios and who own diversified loan portfolios. Id. at 370-
71. However, Posner's general characterizations of shareholders and corporate credi-
tors are not universally true. For example, unsophisticated trade creditors and employ-
ees who hold nondiversified portfolios are likely to be more risk averse and less able to
appraise business risks than are institutional shareholders.
93. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 131-33 (3d ed.
1988).
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risk borne by shareholders and creditors. 4
Diversification is not usually an important consideration in
closely held firms because investors generally invest most of their
assets in a single firm even under a limited liability regime. But one
may invest passively in a portfolio of closely held firms, as by provid-
ing "seed" money for start-up high-technology ventures. Also, a
trademark owner can diversify by franchising outlets and risking
only the loss of revenues from the failure of an outlet rather than
personal liability as a principal.95
b. Monitoring.-It has been observed that limited liability facili-
tates the separation of ownership and control by making passive
ownership feasible.96 Without limited liability, all owners would be
forced either to take an active role in management or to suffer se-
vere consequences from poor management decisions. The speciali-
zation of ownership and management functions makes it less costly
for the firm to attract capital than under an unlimited liability re-
gime because investors need not have any special management
expertise.9 7
Monitoring explains the limited liability contract because in
94. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 101.
The diversification benefit of limited liability is reduced when limited liability is
compared with a regime in which investors are held personally liable only for a portion
of the debt that reflects the percentage of their investment in the firm-the so-called
"pro rata" system. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 3, at 137. But a pro
rata system would be only a second-best solution because it would be costly to adminis-
ter. For example, it would be necessary to value non-cash contributions, and to adjust
liability through costly actions for contribution. See Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems,
supra note 4, at 262.
A risk-bearing theory of limited liability seems inconsistent with the evidence that
the lack of limited liability protection did not impede economic development of risky
enterprises during the early stages of the industrial revolution. See Blumberg, supra note
6, at 594 (no discernable difference in economic development between states that
adopted, and those did not adopt, limited liability). See also Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison,
supra note 7, at 362 (change to limited liability rule had no effect on the granting of
charters in Massachusetts). However, this might be explained by the fact that tort liabil-
ity of enterprises was not well developed by this time. For example, the privity rule of
Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842), still protected companies from
product liability claims to remote consumers.
95. Note that limited liability is provided in this situation not only by incorporation
of the franchisor, but also by recognition of a franchise agreement as a contract around
the default agency rule, similar to "protected relationships" under partnership law. See
infra text accompanying notes 101-105. See also McLaughlin v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,
164 Conn. 317, 324, 321 A.2d 456, 460 (1973) (holding that franchisees are not agents
of their franchisors).
96. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 94.
97. See Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26J. L. & EcON. 327, 330
(1983).
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some situations limited liability reduces total monitoring costs
rather than simply shifting monitoring costs from shareholders to
creditors. First, under a limited liability regime creditors need not
increase their monitoring to offset reduction in monitoring by the
shareholders because they can rely to some extent on shareholders'
continued monitoring to protect their residual claims. 98
Second, the costs of limited liability imposed on creditors de-
pend on the firm's capital structure. For example, limited liability
imposes a relatively low monitoring burden on secured creditors
who monitor individual assets rather than the firm as a whole.99
Also, there is a free rider problem associated with monitoring by
dispersed claimants who each hold relatively small claims and there-
fore are not in a position to recoup the benefits of their monitoring.
The coordination problems associated with monitoring may be less
for creditors than for shareholders where the creditors hold rela-
tively few large claims or employ an indenture trustee.
The monitoring explanation of limited liability somewhat over-
laps the risk-bearing explanation because the degree to which the
parties will incur monitoring costs depends on the amount of risk-
reduction they expect to obtain through monitoring. But the two
explanations are separate because diversification, particularly in
closely held firms, may be incomplete and in any event does not
eliminate systematic risk. Limited liability reduces monitoring costs
that remain after risk diversification is taken into account.
The monitoring explanation might seem to apply only to public
firms where ownership and control are separated. But the following
points present monitoring-based explanations for limited liability in
closely held firms.
(i) Defining Borderline Monitoring Situations.-The limited liabil-
ity contract raises efficiency concerns only to the extent that a moni-
tor shifts responsibility for the firm's debts. Agency and partnership
law impose unlimited liability only approximately in those situations
in which P is a monitor. Like all legal rules, the generalizations of
98. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 99-100. However, limited liability
increases creditors' need to protect against excessively risky investments by limited lia-
bility owners. See supra text accompanying note 75.
99. For some monitoring-oriented theories of secured credit, see generally Jackson
& Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979);
Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49
(1982); Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (1986). But
see Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986) (criticizing these
theories).
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the control, benefit and "co-ownership" tests may be applied impre-
cisely-in this case, to impose liability on nonmonitors. For exam-
ple, a profit-sharing manager may or may not have a partner's
"ultimate" control. The limited liability contract clarifies that the
party seeking the benefit of limited liability is not, in fact, a monitor.
This explanation for limited liability agreements can be illus-
trated by "protected" relationships in partnership law. Section 7(4)
of the Uniform Partnership Act provides that profit sharing is prima
facie evidence of partnership unless profits were received pursuant
to one of five relationships described in subsections 7(4)(a)-(e).' °
These relationships include payment of a debt, wages, rent, or
interest.
Although section 7(4) says that proof of a protected relation-
ship merely removes the presumption of profit sharing rather than
refuting partnership,' 0 ' some courts appear to hold that parties may
be either partners or in a "protected" relationship. 0 2 Under the
latter approach, a P who has some of the attributes of partnership
(such as profit sharing) may be able to clarify nonpartnership status
by entering into a contract that adopts the standard features of a
protected relationship. For example, in Martin v. Peyton,' °3 the
court, in holding that profit-sharing parties were not partners, relied
to some extent on provisions of a credit agreement that stressed
standard credit terms over partnership-type co-ownership.' °4
By clarifying her "protected" status, P can be viewed, particu-
larly in light of section 7(4), as providing notice to outside parties
that she is not a partner. 0 5 In other words, a contract clarifying
100. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 7(4), 6 U.L.A. 39 (1969).
101. See id.
102. See generally Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975); 1 A. BROMBERG & L.
RiBSTEIN, supra note 35, § 2.08(c), at 2:76-2:77.
103. 246 N.Y. 213, 158 N.E. 77 (1927).
104. Among other things, as quoted by the lower court in Martin, the agreement pro-
vided that the creditors "shall not be interested in 'profits' as such," that their profit
share "shall be construed merely as a measure of compensation for loaning ... securi-
ties to [the] firm," and that the creditors shall not "in any way be deemed or treated or
held as partners." Martin v. Peyton, 219 A.D. 297, 302, 220 N.Y.S. 29, 34 (1927). While
this could be characterized as a limitation on the application of the default personal
liability rule, it is better regarded as a limited liability contract because it turns on con-
tracting around personal liability that would have been imposed in the absence of the
contract.
105. See 1 A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, § 2.09(b)(5), at 2:87-2:88. See
infra text accompanying notes 106-109 for a discussion of other considerations, relating
to the substance rather than the form of the agreement, that contributed to the nonpart-
nership characterization in Martin.
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"protected" status may have the effect of opting out of partnership
liability that would have existed but for this contract.
(ii) Specialization of Management Functions in Closely Held Firms.-
Because management and investment functions may be specialized
in closely as well as publicly held firms, limited liability may be effi-
cient even where shareholders are monitors and therefore would be
liable under the default personal liability rule.
Martin v. Peyton illustrates specialization of management in
closely held firms. In Martin a group of creditors loaned marketable
securities to a financially troubled broker to enable it to continue in
business. 0 6 The creditors were entitled to a share of the broker's
profits as consideration for the loan, and had substantial power, in-
cluding a general veto power and the power to accept the resigna-
tions of any of the members of the firm.' 7 Despite the creditors'
control and interest in profits, the court held, consistent with ex-
plicit provisions in the creditors' agreement, that they were not part-
ners. 08 The court stressed, among other things, that the creditors
had only a negative veto rather than an active role in the brokerage
firm.' 0 9 In other words, the creditors had left active management to
the experts-which made sense because the creditors apparently
knew nothing about the brokerage business. In this situation, lim-
ited liability may have reduced the cost of monitoring more than it
increased the cost of credit.
(iii) Creditor Information and Monitoring Costs.-Limited liability
may reduce creditors' and shareholders' monitoring costs in both
closely held and public firms by eliminating the creditors' and share-
holders' need to monitor shareholder wealth.' The cost of credit
under personal liability depends on the principals' wealth and the
likelihood that the wealth might be dissipated."' Creditors must
investigate these facts and, perhaps, negotiate constraints on oppor-
tunistic conduct by shareholders. These additional monitoring and
information costs may prevent the price of credit under unlimited
liability from being lowered sufficiently to compensate the share-
holders for their increased liability risk.
Personal liability not only increases the information and moni-
106. Martin, 219 A.D. at 300, 220 N.Y.S. at 32.
107. Id. at 302, 220 N.Y.S. at 33-34.
108. 246 N.Y. at 223, 158 N.E. at 80; see supra note 104.
109. 246 N.Y. at 219, 158 N.E. at 79-80.
110. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 99; Woodward, supra note 6, at 602.
111. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 3, at 127-28.
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toring costs of creditors dealing with principals through agents, but
also of creditors dealing directly with principals. These creditors
must, under a personal liability regime, assess the risk that the
agent's insolvency will trigger the insolvency of the principal."l 2
While the monitoring and information cost problems just dis-
cussed are inherent in personal liability, they are likely to be more
severe in closely held than in publicly held firms. First, the fewer
the owners that creditors rely on, the more important becomes the
wealth of each owner. Second, creditors are more likely to rely on
the owners' wealth when dealing with a relatively thinly capitalized,
closely-held unlimited liability firm than with a large, publicly traded
unlimited liability firm.
4. Summary.-Limited liability therefore may be an efficient
bargain in closely as well as publicly held corporations. Although
limited liability usually is explained in terms of publicly held firms, it
also serves important functions in closely held firms, including facili-
tating diversification of risk and separation of ownership and con-
trol, and reducing creditors' need to monitor shareholder wealth.
Because there is no a priori basis for believing that limited liability
in close corporations externalizes costs, limited liability should be
available by private ordering in both contexts.
C. Legal Recognition of Private Ordering by Limited Liability Firms
Modem legal trends support the theory that the law should not
force limits on the form of limited liability firms. Close corporation
statutes now commonly permit close corporations to adopt director
control agreements." 3 The limited partnership statutes have been
loosened to provide wide safe-harbors for agreements permitting
control by limited partners." 14 Indeed, one statute has dropped the
control rule entirely,15 and some states offer limited liability forms
that do not include this restriction."l 6
But the law is in transition. The control rule, although watered
down, still restricts private ordering in most limited partnership
statutes. And close corporation statutes do not clearly move in the
direction of greater private ordering. For example, the statutes
112. See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 370-72.
113. See infra note 117.
114. See UNIF. LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP Acr § 303, 6 U.L.A. 307-09 (1985 & Supp.
1990).
115. See GA. CODE ANN. § 14-9-303 (1989).
116. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
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limit the availability of director control agreements to "close corpo-
rations" that formally elect coverage by a certificate provision, or
that meet a statutory definition of a "close corporation," or both., 7
By preventing publicly held corporations from adopting certain
types of terms," 8 the statutes reinforce the idea that the legislature
should be able to dictate the governance terms that firms adopt.' 9
These statutes also make it costly for closely held firms to adopt the
corporate form. For example, technical filing requirements may
frustrate the parties' expectations by causing an agreement to be-
come unenforceable.
Thus, even while ostensibly loosening state control of corpo-
rate terms, the legislatures have maintained their grip. However,
the courts are completing the transition toward private ordering in
close corporations by enforcing director sterilization agreements
despite noncompliance with the disclosure requirement. 2 °
III. REGULATION OF METHOD OF FORMATION OF
LIMITED LIABILITY FIRMS
Part II showed that restrictions on limited liability contracts are
not justified on the ground that this form of contract should be
readily available only to publicly held firms. This Part critically ana-
lyzes and rejects some possible efficiency-based reasons for mandat-
ing formality-in particular, central filing-for the creation of
limited liability contracts. 12 1
117. For a prominent example, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (1983) (permitting
certain agreements in firms that both elect close corporation status by certificate provi-
sion (see id. § 343) and that meet certain qualifications, including 30 or fewer sharehold-
ers and adoption of share transfer restrictions (see id. § 342)).
118. For example, these statutes may prevent publicly held firms from adopting arbi-
tration provisions. See Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C.L. REV. 517,
553-54 (1989).
119. See Karala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the United States, 21 Aiz.
ST. L.J. 663, 690 (1989), stating, "[a]t best, [close corporation] statutes send a legislative
message to courts in those jurisdictions that have continued to adhere stolidly to formal-
istic 'statutory norms' analysis." Id.
120. See Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1980) (hold-
ing that a corporation that did not formally elect close corporation status pursuant to a
statute nevertheless could take advantage of a statutory provision applying to close cor-
porations); Penley v. Penley, 314 N.C. 1, 332 S.E.2d 51 (1985) (enforcing, on other
grounds, an oral agreement that did not comply with a North Carolina statute validating
shareholder agreements); Coffee, Mandatoty/Enabling, supra note 11, at 1644-45 (dis-
cussing Zion as an example of a judicial interpretation of the corporate statute favoring
private ordering).
121. That is not to deny that private parties might favor central filing to clarify their
limited liability status in some situations. By analogy, central filing of security agree-
ments can be regarded as a sort of private ordering. Indeed, even if such filings have
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
A. Identification of Recourse Assets
The law might insist on formalities because creditors need to
identify a particular set of assets against which they can seek recov-
ery. The fact that a firm has not been formally incorporated does
not mean that the creditor has no recourse if she is not paid, be-
cause assets can be identified to informally organized, as well as to
formally organized companies. According to the rules set forth in
the Uniform Partnership Act,' 2 creditors who contract with a part-
ner and agree to look only to the partnership for payment can col-
lect against assets determined to be owned by the partnership,
including property "acquired in the partnership name."1 2 3 Any
company that has not been formally organized under a nonpartner-
ship statute could be considered a partnership.12 4
B. Filling Contracting Gaps
An important function of corporate law is providing a standard
form contract, including terms relevant to the firm's creditors. The
corporate standard form obviously does not apply to a noncorpora-
tion. This may leave gaps in the parties' contract. It does not, how-
ever, justify refusing to recognize the limited liability of the firm's
owners.
To begin with, an informally organized firm would be consid-
ered a partnership, and the partnership standard form would fill any
gaps in the contract.' 25 Assuming the limited liability term is en-
forced, this would mean that the creditor would have all the rights
of a partnership creditor, including the right to recover against the
partnership assets, but not including the right to sue or recover
against the partners individually. 126
It is true that the partnership standard form terms, which as-
very little benefit, their cost is so low for most firms that requiring such filings may be
regarded as trivial. However, the filing requirement is important for those firms that, for
any reason, intentionally or inadvertently neglect to file. Moreover, whatever the direct
costs and benefits of filing, establishing that there is no justification for mandating filings
is, as discussed in Part I, a critical step toward full recognition of the contractual theory
of the corporation.
122. See UNIF. PAR'rNERSHIP AcT § 8, 6 U.L.A. 115 (1969).
123. See id. § 8(3), 6 U.L.A. 115.
124. Partnership is the "default" form of business association in the sense that any
firm that fits within the definition of partnership and that has not been formed under
some other statute is a partnership. See id. § 6(2), 6 U.L.A. 22.
125. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
126. As to whether the parties can contract around this rule under current partner-
ship law, see infra note 142.
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sume the partners' personal liability, may not be suitable for credi-
tors who enter into a limited liability contract. Limited liability
increases the creditors' agency costs because owners who share in
any upside outcomes but are protected from downside outcomes
have the incentive to gamble with the firm's assets at the creditors'
expense. Because these agency costs are reflected in the firm's cost
of credit it may be in all parties' interests to contract for limits on
the owners' use of the assets in order to minimize agency cost.' 27
However, these contracts may be costly. Incorporation provides a
cheap standard form.
But this argument neither justifies nor explains incorporation
as a necessary prerequisite for limited liability. The transaction-
cost-saving function of incorporation does not justify mandatory in-
corporation as a prerequisite to limited liability because there is no
reason why the parties should not be able to choose to forego selec-
tion of the corporate standard form. The firm's owners might be
willing to pay a higher cost of credit as the price of greater freedom
of operation within the firm or of entering into a customized con-
tract with the creditors. Alternatively, the private sector might de-
velop alternative limited liability standard forms that offer a better
mix of terms for both creditors and owners with transaction cost
savings comparable to incorporation. Whether the contract is cus-
tomized or standardized, it could be either delivered to creditors or
publicly recorded without the necessity of incorporation. Incorpo-
ration may be useful, but it is not essential.
Moreover, corporate law cannot be explained as cheap standard
form protection for creditors. Corporation statutes offer little
resistance for owners who wish to injure creditors through misuse of
the firm's assets. There is no meaningful statutory minimum capi-
talization requirement. Traditional "legal capital" and "earned sur-
plus"-type statutes, while purporting to limit distributions of assets
to owners, are actually subject to nearly limitless manipulation.12 8
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act has rejected the idea
of requiring the maintenance of a cushion, and conditions the power
to give dividends on the firm's solvency.'1 9 This adds little to the
127. For an important review of some of these devices, see generally Smith & Warner,
On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. EcON. 117 (1979).
128. See generally B. MANNING, LEGAL CAPrrAL (3d ed. 1990).
129. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 6.40 (1984), prohibits distributions if,
giving effect to the distribution, the corporation is either insolvent in the "equity" sense
(cannot pay its debts as they become due) or its total assets would be less than its liabili-
ties (plus preferred shareholders liquidation rights unless varied by the articles).
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protection investors would have under fraudulent conveyance
statutes. 130
What is left for creditors under corporate law is the highly un-
certain protection found in the veil-piercing cases and based on "in-
adequate capitalization" and other grounds. For present purposes,
the important point about the veil-piercing remedy is that it is not
only not conditioned upon incorporation, but is granted despite
incorporation.
The small protection offered creditors by corporate law is not
surprising. The protection creditors want varies so widely by type
of creditor and type of firm that one-size-fits-all terms would be vir-
tually useless. Some creditors prefer security,' 3 ' while others rely
on terms like those in standard form indentures. While baseline
standard-form terms might be useful for some very small creditors
where transaction costs of customized provisions are high in rela-
tion to their benefits, most such creditors are very short term and
are therefore relatively indifferent to the risk of opportunistic asset
manipulation by owners.
C. Formalities as a Mechanism for Signalling and Compelling Disclosure
It has been argued that refusing to enforce corporate charters
that have not complied with formalities forces incorporators to dis-
close such facts as the number of authorized shares, the registered
address of the corporation, and the state of incorporation. In effect,
personal liability in this situation is a "penalty" default intended to
force disclosure by the more informed party. 132
There are several problems with this rationale for formalities as
a prerequisite to limited liability. First, many of the disclosures re-
quired under state law are neither very important nor related in any
obvious way to limited liability. For example, disclosure of author-
ized shares is relevant to potential dilution of shareholders' interests
but has no bearing on creditor interests. Disclosure of owner con-
tributions to the firm, which arguably does have some bearing on
creditor interests, 33 normally is not required in the filed certificate.
130. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4, 7A U.L.A. 474 (1918), permits credi-
tors to nullify conveyances made without fair consideration (which would include a dis-
tribution of a dividend) by firms whose assets are less than their liabilities. Id. Section 5
extends this protection to conveyances that left the firm with "unreasonably small capi-
tal." Id. § 5, 7 U.L.A. 504 (1918).
131. For explanations of secured debt, see sources cited supra note 99.
132. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 77, at 97-98.
133. Even this is debatable. See B. MANNING, supra note 128, at 50-57.
110 [VOL. 50:80
LIMITED LIABILITY
Second, even if these disclosures may be important to creditors,
or if for most firms their trivial cost is outweighed by a very small
benefit, it does not necessarily follow that they should be legally
compelled. Creditors could demand the disclosures and adjust their
cost of credit to reflect whether the disclosures have been made.
The arguments for mandatory disclosure of information relevant to
limited liability are not as strong as those justifying mandatory dis-
closure in the federal securities laws.'" 4 Penalties for misrepresen-
tation are not important for ensuring the veracity of the
straightforward facts that are relevant to limited liability. Also, the
firm's agents are unlikely to have private reasons for refusing to dis-
close information that minimizes the firm's credit costs.13 5
A related argument for mandatory filing rules is that a state fil-
ing signals the existence of certain contract terms, thereby minimiz-
ing creditors' information costs. For example, a state filing would
assure creditors that the debtor firm has obtained a minimum level
of insurance required for all firms incorporating in the state. But
here, too, the costs of not filing are internalized, so that firms should
not be required to file in order to obtain limited liability. Moreover,
statutes providing for limited liability in fact do not provide signifi-
cant protection for creditors that would be signalled by the state
filing. 13
6
D. Misrepresentation
If a firm calls itself a "corporation" or a "limited partnership,"
creditors justifiably expect that the firm is subject to the provisions
of a corporation statute, and that the firm has made a public filing
containing certain basic information.'3 7 Thus, it might be appropri-
ate in this situation to refuse to enforce the limited liability contract
on the grounds of material misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
However, this result should obtain only if the misrepresentation
was material and if the creditor was injured by it. Materiality is
134. For discussions of mandatory rules in this context, see generally Coffee, Market
Failure and the Economic Case for A Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984);
Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV.
669 (1984).
135. The costs of mandatory incorporation are likely to be far less for most firms than
those of securities disclosures. However, in view of the trivial benefits from mandating
filings and the absence of any indication of market failure that might justify regulation,
regulation probably has insufficient benefits here to outweigh even very small costs.
136. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
137. See Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems, supra note 4, at 268-69; R. POSNER, supra
note 6, at 384.
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questionable. First, creditor protections under corporation statutes
(relating, for example, to dividend payouts) do not go much further
than fraudulent conveyance statutes applicable to all firms."3 8 Sec-
ond, the creditor's contract could always be enforced according to
its terms by applying the corporate provisions to firms that repre-
sent themselves to be corporations.
Moreover, even if the misrepresentation could be characterized
as material, most creditors are not injured by it. If T never seeks the
supposed record that would be provided by incorporation, T has not
been injured by the nonexistence of a record; and T has not been
injured if the firm actually incorporates soon after the transaction,
or at least prior to the time of collection.
E. Summary
There is no justification for requiring compliance with filing re-
quirements as an absolute prerequisite to enforcing limited liability
contracts, except perhaps to the extent that the parties' dealings
would lead creditors to expect that a filing had been made. Even in
this situation, the justification for an incorporation requirement is
weak. In other words, limited liability contracts generally should be
enforced even absent state filing.
IV. LEGAL RECOGNITION OF LIMITED LIABILITY WITHOUT
INCORPORATION
This Part shows that the courts have recognized limited liability
by informal contract in many situations. Case law restrictions on
limited liability can be explained on efficiency grounds rather than
by any general judicial hostility to informal limited liability. Thus,
the positive law supports the normative conclusion of Parts II and
III that there is no justification for mandatory rules restricting the
availability of limited liability.
A. Nonrecourse Contracts
Suppose A Company, an unincorporated business, borrows
money from T under a note specifying that T can collect the note
only from all or certain assets of A Company, and may not collect
from A Company's owner, P.
At one time even such an explicit nonrecourse agreement might
not have been enforced on the ground that personal liability under
138. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
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partnership law is absolute short of incorporation.' 3 9 In Fisheries Co.
v. McCoy,' 40 the court held the trustees of a business trust liable for
personal injury to an employee although as consideration for his
employment, the employee had agreed in writing to look only to the
company's assets for any debts or damages. The court said: "In this
case there is no corporation, so [the trustees] were masters person-
ally, regardless of how explicitly they might have expressed an in-
tention to employ only in a representative capacity. They could not
change their legal status by contract."'' 4 '
Refusal to enforce explicit nonrecourse agreements, however,
can be rationalized only on the basis that the corporate privilege
must be conferred by the state rather than by private agreement.
Accordingly, modem cases support enforcement of these agree-
ments. 1
42
B. Signalling, Knowledge and Notice of Nonrecourse Agreements
Even if explicit nonrecourse agreements are enforced, incorpo-
ration arguably remains useful as a cheap way of contracting for
limited liability. It is important, therefore, to consider legal impedi-
ments that might raise the costs of contracting for limited liability
without incorporation.
A firm's residual claimants clearly cannot obtain limited liability
merely by specifying in their agreement that they are not personally
liable for debts.' 43 Nor does the limited liability agreement neces-
139. For a discussion of the English law, see Butler, England, supra note 15, at 181.
140. 202 S.W. 343 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
141. Id. at 348.
142. See E. WARREN, supra note 46, at 367; Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate
Groups, 11J. CORP. L. 573, 582 n.35 (1986) (citing early cases enforcing limited liability
clauses in insurance policies). Indeed, the courts have enforced nonrecourse contracts
even where the effect was to avoid liability that otherwise would be imposed on corpo-
rate principals by statute. See Preston v. Howell, 219 Iowa 230, 257 N.W. 415 (1934);
Continental Corp. v. Gowdy, 283 Mass. 204, 186 N.E. 244 (1933). Both of these cases
involved nonrecourse against directors. For a discussion tracing English recognition of
informal limited liability contracts, see Butler, England, supra note 15, at 181-82.
It is true that any firm that conforms to the definition in § 6(1) of the Uniform
Partnership Act arguably would be a partnership unless, pursuant to § 6(2), it is formed
under some other statute. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 6(1), (2), 6 U.L.A. 22 (1916). If the
firm is a partnership, the members arguably would be personally liable under § 15 of the
Uniform Partnership Act, which is not qualified by any opting-out language. Id. § 15, 6
U.L.A. 174. But opting-out language in the Uniform Partnership Act generally refers to
the partners alone, and the lack of such language in a provision applying to creditors
should not be interpreted to invalidate a contrary agreement to which creditors consent.
143. Similarly, an agreement among parties to a firm that they are not partners does
not bind third parties. See 1 A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, § 2.05(c), at
2:38-2:39.
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sarily become binding if it has been recorded publicly because the
plaintiff may not know of the need to check the record.'44
But a plaintiff who has contracted with knowledge of the limited
liability agreement is generally bound by the limitation of liabil-
ity. '45 Thus, if a creditor extended credit to "P Company, a Limited
Liability Company," there is authority supporting limited liability
for the principals of P Company even absent any further agreement
with T.1
4 6
Moreover, the agreement can be signalled other than through
explicit reference to the limited liability nature of the company.
This is arguably the function of the listing of "protected relation-
ships" in Uniform Partnership Act section 7(4):'7 by adopting clear
indicia of a debtor-creditor, employee-employer or other relation-
ship listed in that subsection, P serves notice to those contracting
with the firm that she is not a partner.
C. Undisclosed Principals
One method of entering into a limited liability contract might
be for the principal to remain behind the scenes so that the creditor
could be said to be contracting only with the agent. Nevertheless,
the well-established legal rule is that the principal P, although un-
disclosed at the time of the contract, is liable to the creditor. 4 ' The
144. See Allegheny Tank Car Co. v. Culbertson, 288 F. 406 (N.D. Tex. 1923).
145. See McCarthy v. Parker, 243 Mass. 465, 138 N.E. 8 (1923). This is consistent with
the established principle in partnership law that a third party is bound by limitations on
a partner's or agent's authority of which she has knowledge. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT
§ 9(1), (4), 6 U.L.A. 132-33 (1916); 1 A. BROMBERG & L. RiBSTEIN, supra note 35,
§ 4.02(c), at 4:22-4:24. But see Thompson v. Schmitt, 115 Tex. 53, 274 S.W. 554 (1925).
The Thompson court held that plaintiffs could recover against the holder of a beneficial
interest in a business trust despite their knowledge of the provisions of a publicly re-
corded trust instrument providing that the holders shall not be held individually liable.
The concession approach appears to explain the result: the court noted the state policy
requiring formation of a limited partnership in order for partners to limit their liability.
Id. at 68, 274 S.W. at 559.
146. See Bank of Topeka v. Eaton, 100 F. 8, 9 (1900), aff'd, 107 F. 1003 (C.C.D. Mass.
1901); East River Sav. Bank v. Samuels, 284 N.Y. 470, 478, 31 N.E.2d 906, 910 (1940).
147. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7(4), 6 U.L.A. 39 (1916); see also text accompanying
note 105.
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 186 (1958); Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed
Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1969 (1987); Lewis, The Liability of the
Undisclosed Principal in Contract, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1909); Mechem, The Liability of an
Undisclosed Principal, 23 HARV. L. REV. 513, 515 (1913) (describing rule as "well settled").
For some cases recognizing liability of an undisclosed principal, see Davis v. Childers,
381 So. 2d 200 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); Bertram Yacht Sales, Inc. v. West, 209 So. 2d 677
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Amortibanc Inv. Co., Inc. v. Rampart Assoc. Mgt. Inc., 6 Kan.
App. 2d 227, 627 P.2d 389 (1981). For a comparative law approach showing that differ-
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rule has been described as an "anomaly."' 49 The rule is interesting
for present purposes because, in the absence of other apparent ex-
planations, it seems to be based on the theory that limited liability is
a state-conferred privilege.
The explanations of the rule that have been proposed so far are
unsatisfactory. The Restatement rationalizes the liability on the basis
of the principal's right to control the agent.'5 0 While this theory
makes sense as a default bargain,' 5 1 it should not prevent the parties
from contracting around the default.
The liability of the undisclosed principal was explained by
Randy Barnett on the basis of a "consent" theory of contract. 152
Professor Barnett argues that P's liability makes sense because P has
consented to the transfer of rights to A, who is then empowered by
virtue of this consent to transfer the rights to T.15 3
The problem with the consent rationalization is that it mistakes
what P has consented to. T arguably has agreed to look only to A for
collection and to charge an interest rate that reflects the risk of look-
ing to A's assets. This interest rate may be higher than the rate T
would charge if T could look to P's assets for collection.' P, as the
residual claimant, ultimately bears this higher rate. Thus, P has con-
sented only to a particular tradeoff of a higher cost of credit 155 for
immunity from liability-just as in any limited liability contract. P
has not consented in any realistic sense to a liability to T. In short, P
should not be held liable, because liability is inconsistent with any
contract between T and P.
Professor Barnett rejects what he calls the "bargain" theory of
contract,15 6 and argues that the failure of the bargain theory to ex-
plain the undisclosed principal cases shows the "weakness" of this
ent legal systems have reached similar results, see Mueller-Frienfels, Comparative Aspects
of Undisclosed Agency, 18 MOD. L. REV. 33 (1955).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 186, comment a (1958).
150. Id.
151. See supra section II(B)(l).
152. See Barnett, supra note 148, at 1978-84.
153. Id. at 1980-84.
154. If T had contracted with A acting on behalf of a disclosed principal, T could look
only to P for collection. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 320-321 (1958) (lia-
bility of an agent for a disclosed or partially disclosed principal).
155. P may have gotten more favorable terms from T by virtue of being undisclosed
if, for example, T would have increased its price had it known it was dealing with P. This
alone does not justify imposing liability on P contrary to its contract with T. See infra
note 165.
156. See Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 287-89 (1986).
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theory.157 While the bargain theory may be correct and the undis-
closed principal cases wrong, Barnett argues plausibly that a well-
entrenched legal rule should be accorded some weight by legal the-
orists. 5 " The question is whether there is some other explanation
for undisclosed principal liability than Barnett's constricted consent
theory.
In fact, a strong efficiency-based argument can be made for un-
disclosed principal liability. First, it is important to note that in the
usual undisclosed principal case, the agent is liable to the third
party.' 5 9 If the agent's acts were authorized, the principal ordinarily
would have a duty to indemnify the agent or the agent's bankrupt
estate.1 60  Thus, where the agent is authorized, the undisclosed
principal's liability avoids a circularity of action.
An argument for liability also exists in some cases where A is
unauthorized. Liability cannot necessarily be explained here by the
"circularity" argument because the principal probably has no duty
of indemnification. 16 1 Nor can it be explained by application of ap-
parent authority, since the agent is not acting "professedly as
agent" for another, 162 or on the basis of the principal's consent. 163
But liability may be justified as what Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner
call a "strong" default, in which the principal has the burden of ex-
157. See Barnett, supra note 148, at 1977. Barnett also shows how other contract theo-
ries he has rejected-will, reliance, and substantive fairness-fail to explain undisclosed
principal liability. Id. at 1974-77. He notes how an efficiency theory might explain un-
disclosed agency law on the basis of overcoming "hold-out" problems arising out of T's
seeking to exploit its leverage in dealing with P. Id. at 1976-77. This dubiously assumes
that it is efficient to permit nondisclosure or misrepresentation by one party to a con-
tract to overcome the other party's bargaining leverage.
158. See id. at 2001. See also Clark, Contracts, supra note 11, at 1737 (rules supported by
"tradition" are entitled to respect). For theories of why the common law can be ex-
pected to produce generally efficient outcomes, see generally Priest, The Common Law
Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6J. LEG. STuD. 65 (1977); Rubin, Why is the Com-
mon Law Efficient?, 6J. LEG. STuD. 51 (1977).
159. See supra note 154.
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 438 (1958) (giving the agent a right of
indemnification where it is "fair" that the principal should bear the loss, subject to con-
trary agreement).
161. See id. § 440 (no duty to indemnify for a loss that does not benefit the principal
and that results from the agent's "fault").
162. See id. § 8.
163. Professor Barnett justifies liability where P has received possession of the goods
through A, and has a duty to make restitution because of his consent to an agency rela-
tionship. See Barnett, supra note 148, at 1997-99. But this does not explain the broader
rule, which would hold P liable for breach of A's contract to buy goods that were not
delivered, or where A used the goods for his own benefit. For an example of liability in
the latter situation, see Morris Oil Co., Inc. v. Rainbow Oilfield Trucking, 106 N.M. 237,
741 P.2d 840 (1987).
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plicitly contracting with the third party agent around the personal
liability default in order to force the principal to reveal information
to the third party."4 The strong default is needed because parties
extending credit to agents of undisclosed principals lack critical in-
formation relevant to assessing the risk of nonrepayment of the
debt: a party who has the power to control the agent's use of the
funds has incentives to take risks that are excessive from the third
party's perspective.' 65
To see why a strong default is justified, consider the effect of a
rule limiting the liability of undisclosed principals. T could charge A
based on the increased cost of debt attributable to P's limited liabil-
ity unless A identified itself as not acting for an undisclosed P. But it
is more likely that Ts would charge all As the same cost of credit
because of the high cost of determining the truth of A's representa-
tion. This would deter some dealings with parties who might be
agents, as well as permit some undisclosed P's to externalize costs.
The undisclosed principal rule avoids these problems by giving un-
disclosed P's the incentive to identify themselves.' 66 Thus T can
charge a cost of credit that is based on the assumption that parties in
control are personally liable for the debts of the firm.
A possible problem with this rationale is that it seems anoma-
lous that A would tolerate control by the undisclosed principal if A
bears the risk of personal liability. This explains why P's liability for
164. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 77, at 123-29. Ayres and Gertner cite other rea-
sons for strong defaults-forcing the parties to define terms in order to save judicial
resources, and discouraging contracts that generate externalities. The information-re-
vealing rationale is the only one that appears applicable to the present situation.
165. The strong default is not, however, justified to compel P to reveal its identity
where T might refuse to deal with P or charge more if it knew it was dealing with P. For
cases refusing to redress any injury to T arising out of this fact pattern, see Kelly Asphalt
Block Co. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 211 N.Y. 68, 105 N.E. 88 (1914) (contract en-
forceable against T despite T's argument that it would have refused to deal with P, its
competitor); Senor v. Bangor Mills, 211 F.2d 685 (3d Cir. 1954) (T could not recover
against undisclosed P for A's unauthorized contract; P deliberately hid its identity be-
cause T would have charged more if it had known it was dealing with P). In this situa-
tion, because T is aware of the ubiquitous possibility of assignment of the contract to a
third party, and because sellers generally bear the risk that their buyers might have paid
more, there is no material nondisclosure. See Barnett, supra note 148, at 1989-92. Also,
requiring P to disclose its identity would reduce P's incentive to acquire the resources
that made its bargaining position advantageous, as where a noted mining engineer seeks
to buy land with suspected mineral resources. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 77, at
128. Thus, forcing disclosure relevant to bargaining position, unlike forcing disclosure
relevant to the agency costs of debt, may be inefficient.
166. The rule would probably not force disclosure by purchasers who are hiding in
order to secure a favorable price (see supra note 165) because such a buyer would not be
concerned about exposure to liability.
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unauthorized acts is limited to the situation where the agent has
been placed in apparent charge of a business actually owned by the
principal, and has acted generally within the scope of the busi-
ness.167 P's liability makes sense because the agent in apparent
charge and without a stake in the business has little incentive to
avoid risk. These facts are hidden from T who therefore does not
take into account the increased riskiness of the debt when setting
the price of its credit. Thus, the rule imposing liability gives P the
incentive to minimize risks to the third party. Without explicitly
contracting with the third party, P cannot limit its duty by placing
narrow limits on the agent's authority.
The theory of undisclosed principal liability articulated here
also explains the seemingly peculiar rules regarding election of rem-
edies. T cannot obtain joint judgments against both A and P even if
T collects only a single inadequate recovery from A. If T proceeds
against A after P is identified, T is barred from later proceeding
against P, even if T fails to obtain satisfaction from A. 6 ' Although
the rule has been sharply criticized, 169 it is sound. P is liable only
because it has not contracted around the default rule. P has the
burden of contracting around this rule because otherwise T errone-
ously assumes that it is contracting with a principal. T may reject
the benefit of this rule and recover on the basis of the apparent con-
tract binding A. But T should not get a better bargain than it
thought it had made by being permitted to proceed against the as-
sets of both A and P.
In summary, the undisclosed principal's liability accords with
general contract policies. It does not indicate judicial support for
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 195 (1958). See also id. § 194 (liability of
undisclosed principal for unauthorized acts of general agent). For a leading case involv-
ing liability in this situation, see Watteau v. Fenwick [1893] 1 Q.B. 346. A was placed in
apparent charge of a hotel and tavern with his name above the door, but with instruc-
tions to buy only beer and ale. Principal was bound by A's purchase of other supplies
reasonably related to operation of the tavern.
168. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Stevens, 16 Utah 2d 173, 397 P.2d 983 (1965). The rule
has been qualified in several states: T must elect only after the agency issue has been
determined, and then only if P has not waived its right to compel election. See Davis v.
Childers, 381 So. 2d 200 (Ala. Ct. App. 1979); Amortibanc Inv. Co., Inc. v. Rampart
Assoc. Mgt. Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 227, 627 P.2d 389 (1981).
169. See Richmond, Scraping Some Moss from the Old Oaken Doctrine: Election Between Un-
disclosed Principals and Agents and Discovery of Their Net Worth, 66 MARQ.. L. REV. 745 (1983);
Sargent & Rochvarg, A Reexamination of the Agency Doctrine of Election, 36 U. MIAMi L. REV.
411 (1982). There seems to be a trend toward rejection of the election rule. See Grinder
v. Bryans Road Bldg. & Supply Co., 290 Md. 687, 432 A.2d 453 (1981); Engelstad v.
Cargill, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 284 (Minn. 1983); Crown Controls, Inc. v. Smiley, 110 Wash.
2d 695, 756 P.2d 717 (1988).
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the theory that limited liability is a state-conferred privilege that is
unavailable by private contract.
D. Promoter Liability
A promoter of a new venture who contracts on behalf of a cor-
poration to be formed is not personally liable if the creditor agrees
to look only to the corporation-to-be either from the time of the
contract or from the time that the corporation is formed. 7 ° Thus,
the limited liability contract is enforced even without a state filing.
More surprising and troubling from the standpoint of the con-
tract theory of limited liability are the many cases holding promoters
liable."7 ' While these cases reason that the parties did not intend to
limit the promoters' liability, the contract language often clearly
reflects that the promoter was acting for a corporation-to-be and
thus apparently did not intend to take on personal liability expo-
sure. Liability therefore seems to be based on the theory that lim-
ited liability is a corporate privilege that can be obtained only by
incorporation. 72
In fact, the courts' reluctance to exonerate the promoter is con-
sistent with the parties' intent. A contract entered into by the pro-
moter for a "corporation-to-be" is ambiguous both as to whether
there is a present obligor and as to what happens when the corpora-
170. For some cases holding that the promoter is not personally liable, see Quaker
Hill v. Parr, 148 Colo. 45, 364 P.2d 1056 (1961); Stap v. Chicago Aces Tennis Team,
Inc., 63 Ill. App. 3d 23, 379 N.E.2d 1298 (1978); Isle of Thye Land Co. v. Whisman, 262
Md. 682, 279 A.2d 484 (1971); Sherwood & Roberts-Oregon, Inc. v. Alexander, 269 Or.
389, 525 P.2d 135 (1974); Company Stores Dev. Corp. v. Pottery Warehouse, Inc., 733
S.W.2d 886 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); Aloe Ltd., Inc. v. Koch, 733 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1987); Betchard-Clayton, Inc. v. King, 41 Wash. App. 887, 707 P.2d 1361 (1985).
171. See Surovcik v. D & K Optical, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1171 (M.D. Pa. 1988); StanleyJ.
How & Assocs., Inc. v. Boss, 222 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Iowa 1963); In re Olsen, 6 Bankr.
255 (M.D. Fla. 1980); Malisewski v. Singer, 123 Ariz. 195, 598 P.2d 1014 (1979);
Coopers & Lybrand v. Fox, 758 P.2d 683 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); LeZontier v. Shock, 78
Mich. App. 324, 260 N.W.2d 85 (1977); Jacobson v. Stern, 96 Nev. 56, 605 P.2d 198
(1980); Skandinavia, Inc. v. Cormier, 218 N.H. 215, 514 A.2d 1250 (1986); Smith v.
Morgan, 50 N.C. App. 208, 272 S.E.2d 602 (1980); RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc.
v. Graziano, 467 Pa. 220, 355 A.2d 830 (1976); Herbert v. Boardman, 134 Vt. 78, 349
A.2d 710 (1975); Goodman v. Darden, Doman & Stafford Assoc's, 100 Wash. 2d 476,
670 P.2d 648 (1983).
172. For an article criticizing the courts' unwillingness to limit the promoter's liability
as contrary to the parties' expectations, see Kessler, Promoters' Contracts: A Statutory Solu-
tion, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 566 (1961). Ayres and Gertner, supra note 77, at 120-21, note
that the How case exemplifies the difficulty of negating the personal liability default, but
they do not give a rationale for the difficulty. The case does not seem to fit any of their
explanations for "strong" defaults: externalities, incentive to disclose information, or
conserving judicial resources.
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tion is formed. If the corporation is formed prior to plaintiff's
claim, this would seem to resolve the first ambiguity. But plaintiff
probably does not intend to accept any firm-regardless of how it is
capitalized and when it is formed-as a substitute for the pro-
moter. ' In fact, the probable reason why there was no incorpora-
tion at the time of the contract despite the fact that incorporation is
a simple formality is that the business had not been formed. Uncon-
ditional limited liability for the promoter therefore significantly dif-
fers from recognizing limited liability of a firm that exists, and
consequently can be appraised by the creditor, at the time of the
contract. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the courts have in-
sisted on strong evidence 74 that the plaintiff intended to look only
to the corporation.'7 5
The problem of determining the parties' intent is illustrated by
the often-cited cases of StanleyJ. How &Associates, Inc. v. Boss' 7 6 and
Quaker Hill, Inc. v. Parr.177 In How, the plaintiff architect contracted
to furnish plans for a hotel. The contract was with "Owner: ...
Edw. A. Boss By: Edwin A. Boss, agent for a Minnesota corporation
to be formed who will be the obligor." 178 Despite this seemingly
clear language, the court held Boss individually liable. The court
stressed that the contract called for plaintiff to begin work and to
begin receiving payments soon after the contract was entered
into.1 7 9 Moreover, only an Iowa corporation named "Minneapolis-
Hunter Hotels Co." was formed-there was no evidence that this
corporation had a charter or bylaws, and it had no assets at the time
of plaintiff's action.' On the other hand, in Quaker Hill, the court
173. Thus, assumption of liabilities by a partnership's successor-including by a cor-
porate successor-usually does not relieve the partners of liability. See UNIF. PARTNER-
SHIP AcT § 36, 6 U.L.A. 436 (1969); 2 A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, supra note 35, § 7.14
(continuing liability of partners after dissolution); see id. § 7.21 (effect of incorporation
on existing liabilities).
174. See, e.g., Goodman v. Darden, Doman & Stafford Assocs., 100 Wash. 2d 476, 480,
670 P.2d 648, 651 (1983) (finding a "strong inference" that plaintiff intended to con-
tract with an existing party).
175. In RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc. v. Graziano, 467 Pa. 220, 355 A.2d 830
(1976), Judge Manderino dissented from a decision holding the promoter liable, opin-
ing that the rationality of plaintiff's bargain was not at issue and that plaintiff could have
protected himself. Id. at 225, 355 A.2d at 835 (ManderinoJ., dissenting). See also Kess-
ler, supra note 172, at 574. Nevertheless, if the agreement is ambiguous, the rationality
of a particular interpretation bears on the parties' intent. In fact, the RKO dissent may
have been correct given the circumstances of that case. See infra note 182.
176. 222 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. Iowa 1963).
177. 148 Colo. 45, 364 P.2d 1056 (1961).
178. 222 F. Supp. at 938.
179. Id. at 941.
180. Id. at 939.
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held against promoter liability where T had clearly insisted on an
immediate contract with a corporation-to-be, despite the fact that,
as in How, a corporation with a different name was formed and it
never functioned. ''
These cases suggest that there is more ambiguity in the contract
than might first appear from the "corporation-to-be" language, and
that the cases involve a fact-specific inquiry as to the parties' intent.
While there are occasional aberrations 182 the cases holding promot-
ers liable do not support the state-privilege theory of limited
liability.
E. Corporation by Estoppel
Suppose T enters into a contract with P Corporation, unaware
that P Corporation has not yet been incorporated. While this is
often referred to as a "corporation by estoppel," it is more accu-
rately characterized as a contract for limited liability between T and
the principals of P Corporation. This contract is less ambiguous
than the promoter contracts because T clearly intended to contract
only with a corporation. Nevertheless, the rule persists today by
statute in many jurisdictions that those "assuming" or "purporting"
to act in the name of a corporation that they know has not been
formally incorporated are personally liable to creditors with whom
they contract.'8" This rule has led to results that were surprising
181. 148 Colo. at 51, 364 P.2d at 1059 (1961).
182. A prominent example is RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc. v. Graziano, 467 Pa.
220, 355 A.2d 830 (1976), in which the promoter was held liable although the contract
clearly provided that upon formation of the corporation, the contract should be con-
strued to have been made with the corporation and subsequently the corporation was
formed. Id. at 227, 355 A.2d at 834.
183. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 2.04 (1984), which provides:
"All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there was no
incorporation under this Act, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created
while so acting." For examples of cases applying this theory, see Keene v. National
Medical Care, Inc., 700 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Booker Custom Packing Co., Inc.
v. Sallomi, 149 Ariz. 124, 716 P.2d 1061 (1986); Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (D.C.
1964); Ratner v. Central Nat'l Bank of Miami, 414 So. 2d 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
review denied, 424 So. 2d 762 (1982); Echols v. Vienna Sausage Mfg. Co., 162 Ga. App.
158, 290 S.E.2d 484 (1982); Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 591
P.2d 1078 (1979); Timberline Equip. Co., Inc. v. Davenport, 267 Or. 64, 514 P.2d 1109
(1973); Sterling Press v. Pettit, 580 P.2d 599 (Utah 1978).
For the analogous theory in the limited partnership setting, see UNIF. LIMITED PART-
NERSHIP AcT § 304, 6 U.L.A. 317 (1985 & Supp. 1990) (providing one who invests in a
business erroneously believing it is a limited partnership may be liable under certain
circumstances).
Note that the purporting-to-act provision arguably applies even in the promoter
situation, where plaintiff knows no corporation has been formed. The official comment
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and clearly contrary to the expectations of both parties.'
Refusal to enforce the apparent limited liability contract is not
justified on the ground that T has been injured by the misrepresen-
tation of P Corporation's status, because the misrepresentation is
probably immaterial and rarely harmful.' 85
This leaves the explanation that refusal to enforce the contract
in the absence of compliance with statutory formalities is based
solely on state's assertion of monopoly power to create corporate
terms. Indeed, this explanation is reflected in the official comment
to section 2.04 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act,
which imposes liability on those who act as a corporation without
incorporation: "[T]o recognize limited liability in this situation
threatens to undermine the incorporation process, since one then
may obtain limited liability by consistently conducting business in
the corporate name."' 86
The refusal to enforce the limited liability contract in this situa-
tion has been criticized by commentators. 187 Moreover, the courts
have interpreted the statute narrowly, recognizing limited liability
to § 2.04 suggests that defendants may not be liable only in the specific situation where
the plaintiff has urged defendant to contract in the name of the nonexistent corporation,
and cites as an example Quaker Hill v. Parr. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2.04
official comment (1984). See also supra text accompanying notes 177-181. However, this
ignores the limited liability contract that may exist in other situations. See supra notes
137-138 and accompanying text. For a case holding that the predecessor to REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 2.04 does not apply to promoter cases, see Sherwood &
Roberts-Oregon, Inc. v. Alexander, 269 Or. 389, 395, 525 P.2d 135, 138 (1974) (reason-
ing that the statute did not unambiguously reverse the common-law rule enforcing the
contract).
184. See T-K Distrib., Inc. v. Soldevere, 146 Ariz. 150, 704 P.2d 280 (1985) (defend-
ants held personally liable for debt incurred during brief period of revocation of charter
for failure to file a report and pay a fee, where neither party was aware of the revoca-
tion); Thompson & Green Machinery Co., Inc. v. Music City Lumber Co., Inc., 683
S.W.2d 340 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) (both parties believed the company was incorpo-
rated, and in fact it was incorporated the day after the promissory note was signed).
185. See supra subpart III(c).
186. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT § 2.04, official comment, illustration 4
(1984). See also Dodd, Partnership Liability of Shareholders in Defective Corporations, 40 HARV.
L. REV. 521, 551, 557 (1927). Dodd also noted that partnership liability in defective
corporations is compelled by the "fundamental principle" that liability follows owner-
ship rights-a clear rejection of the contractual nature of the owners' liability. Id. at 550.
There is also an historical precedent that supports this explanation: The English
Bubble Act was passed in 1720 specifically to protect the South Sea Company from com-
peting joint stock companies and to protect Parliament's monopoly on corporate privi-
leges. See E. WARREN, supra note 46, at 329; Butler, England, supra note 15, at 171-73.
187. See LATrIN, CORPORATIONS 197 (1971) (estoppel accords with the parties' expec-
tations, and the state lacks a "vital interest in having exact specification of corporate
existence complied with"; but incorporation by general act was originally treated suspi-
ciously); Magruder, A Note on Partnership Liability of Stockholders in Defective Corporations, 40
[VOL. 50:80
1991] LIMITED LABILrry 123
consistent with the parties' expectations whenever such a result was
not specifically precluded by statute."I Indeed, one exhaustive sur-
vey of cases concluded that corporation-by-estoppel was a dominant
approach in the case law prior to the general emergence of statutory
provisions outlawing the theory.' 89
It is significant that nonrecognition of limited liability is sup-
ported solely by statute: there is no long common-law tradition that
might lend some normative support to the rule."9 Nor does the
state competition for charters demonstrate the efficiency of the pur-
porting-to-act statutes. The states' competition for chartering busi-
ness, viewed in light of capital market and other constraints on firms
to adopt efficient governance terms, generally helps filter inefficient
terms out of state corporation statutes.' 9 ' But the chartering mar-
ket may not effectively discipline purporting-to-act provisions. The
statutes do not encourage paying customers (that is, incorporators)
to incorporate elsewhere because the statutes do not penalize those
who unknowingly fail to comply.' 9 2 Moreover, these provisions
have an anti-competitive effect in that they help preserve the states'
monopoly over corporate terms by preventing competition by pri-
HAtv. L. REV. 733, 744 (1927) (noting that the sole basis of refusing to enforce the
contract is that limited liability is a jealously guarded privilege).
188. See, e.g., Cranson v. International Business Machs. Corp., 234 Md. 477, 200 A.2d
33, 39 (1964); Harry Rich Corp. v. Feinberg, 518 So. 2d 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(interpreting an assuming-to-act statute as not imposing liability where defendant did
not know of the failure to incorporate); H.F. Phillipsborn & Co. v. Suson, 59 Ill. 2d 465,
322 N.E.2d 45 (1974); Sherwood & Roberts-Oregon, Inc. v. Alexander, 269 Or. 389,
525 P.2d 135 (1974) (holding that promoters were not liable on a note despite an as-
suming-to-act statute); Molander v. Raugust-Mathwig, Inc., 44 Wash. App. 53, 722 P.2d
103 (1986).
189. See Frey, Legal Analysis and the 'DeFacto' Doctrine, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 1153, 1162
(1952) (finding that courts often refused to impose liability on the owners of defective
corporations where the parties dealt on a corporate basis, although they often rational-
ized this result in terms of the "de facto corporation" doctrine).
190. See supra note 158.
191. See R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORTION 6-11, 69-70 (1978). For
data supporting this view, see Dodd & Leftwich, The Marketfor Corporate Charters: "Un-
healthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53J. Bus. 259 (1980).
192. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 2.04, official comment (1984). Inter-
estingly enough, Delaware does not provide for purporting-to-act liability. Title 8, sec-
tion 106 of the Delaware Code simply specifies when the corporation comes into
existence, and says nothing about noncorporate limited liability contracts. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 106 (1983). As the national leader in the state chartering competition,
Delaware has fashioned what is predominantly an enabling statute that accommodates
rather than restricts private ordering. Accordingly, Delaware has least to fear from com-
petition by noncorporate forms. It may also be significant that Delaware attracts larger-
capitalization firms in which problems concerning formalities and pre-incorporation
transactions are least likely to arise.
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vate ordering alternatives. Those who seek corporate features, par-
ticularly including limited liability, must pay franchise taxes and deal
with state legislators for changes in the statutes.
Thus, the purporting-to-act restriction on limited liability con-
tracts is an attempt by state legislatures to guard their franchises
and demonstrates the regulatory theory of the corporation in action.
However, even here the overall dominance of the contract theory is
evident: these restrictions have no case law support independent of
the statute and can easily be avoided by firms that seek limited liabil-
ity other than by doing business as a "corporation."
F. Formal Noncorporate Limited Liability Firms
State statutes provide for several different types of non-
corporate limited liability firms. The most prominent variations are
the limited partnership, t'9 the business trust,' 94 and the limited lia-
bility company.' g Some statutes providing for limited liability com-
panies are similar to limited partnership statutes except that they
loosen some of the restrictions of that form, for example, by al-
lowing limited partners to participate in management without losing
their limited liability status.' 96 In all cases, the statutes provide that
the firm may be formed only by a state filing rather than solely by
private contract.
These statutory limited liability forms illustrate three important
points about regulation of limited liability. First, they show that fil-
ing requirements persist-in the absence of any possible efficiency
justification-merely to maintain the fiction of state control over
193. Most states have adopted the REVISED UNIF. LIMrrED PARTNERSHIP AcT, 6 U.L.A.
226 (1976 & Supp. 1990). For a listing of these states, see id. at 226-27. The original
1916 version of § 6 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act is still in effect in a few
states. For a listing of these states, see UNIF. LiMrrED PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 179,
179 (1916 & Supp 1990).
194. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 3801-15 (1983); FLA. STAT. § 609 (1977); MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 182, §§ 1-14 (1987).
195. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-101 et. seq. (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. § 608 (1990);
1990 Kan. H.B. 3064; Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1977). See generally Hamill,
supra note 51; Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 11 FLA. ST. L. REV. 387 (1983).
Limited liability statutes have been proposed in several other states, and are being stud-
ied by an American Bar Association subcommittee.
As discussed supra note 51, limited liability company statutes are also more restric-
tive in some respects than limited partnership statutes-as by mandating nontransfer-
ability of interests-in order to ensure compliance with mandatory tax classification
rules.
196. See FLA. STAT. §§ 608.424, .436 (1990); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-113, -116 (1977).
For discussions of the control rule applicable to limited partnerships, see supra text ac-
companying notes 53, 114-116.
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corporate terms. Delaware's statutory filing requirement for busi-
ness trusts cannot be explained as providing for gap-filling, disclo-
sure or signalling.' 97 Nor does the statute restrict the form of the
business in any material way or include creditor-protection provi-
sions such as limits on distributions.' 9 8 In other words, creating a
Delaware business trust is virtually identical to simply contracting
with third parties as a "limited liability company." And yet a state
filing nevertheless remains a prerequisite to limited liability for ben-
eficiaries of a business trust.' 99
Second, the noncorporate standard forms illustrate the rela-
tionship between the common law and legislation in the preserva-
tion of the state legislative monopoly on corporate features. There
might be no demand for these statutes or filings under them if the
courts recognized the enforceability of private limited liability con-
tracts. 2 °° While the courts have gone a long way in that direction,2 0 1
statutes that provide for partnership liability as a residual term, 20 2
or impose liability for purporting to act as a corporation,2 0 impede
full recognition of private ordering. Until the courts finally and
clearly interpret these provisions as not precluding enforceability of
limited liability forms that are both noncorporate and nonstatutory,
compliance with state filing remains a prudent course.
197. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3801-15 (1983). See also supra subparts III(B),(C).
198. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3803 (1983). Under the common law, beneficiaries
of a business trust are entitled to limited liability only if they do not participate in man-
agement. See Greco v. Hubbard, 252 Mass. 37, 44, 147 N.E. 272, 275 (1925); A. BROM-
BERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP 174 (1968); E. WARREN, supra note 46, at
384-98.
199. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3801 (1983) ("business trust" defined to include only
firms that have filed a certificate); Hausam v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 99 Or. App. 533, 783
P.2d 39 (1989) (trustees of business trust held personally liable for debts where no statu-
tory filing was made). Indeed, the beneficiaries may be even worse off under the statute
than they were under the common law, since they might be held liable for failing to file
even if they lack partnership-type control.
200. There is also a possible federal tax explanation for the statutory forms. The tax
distinction between corporate and noncorporate firms (see supra text accompanying
notes 33-35) creates a market for noncorporate state statutory forms that clearly differ-
entiates between the two. This raises the interesting question whether the tax distinc-
tion can be explained at least partly as a mechanism for maintaining the state monopoly
on corporate features. It is noteworthy that, although the first limited liability company
act was passed in Wyoming thirteen years ago, Internal Revenue Service rulings in the
last two years classifying as partnerships for tax purposes companies formed under the
Wyoming (see Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360) and Florida (see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-37-
010 (June 16, 1989)) limited liability company acts suddenly have spurred action by bar
groups seeking statutes in several other states.
201. See supra subparts IV(A) - (D).
202. See supra note 124.
203. See supra subpart IV(E).
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Finally, the noncorporate standard forms show that an evolu-
tionary process, operating through the common law and the state
competition for franchise business, is breaking down barriers to pri-
vate ordering. Judicial enforcement of private contracts providing
for corporate features2 provides an incentive for private parties to
develop forms like the business trust. This creates a constituency
pressing for legislative authorization. One result is a business trust
statute in Delaware that leaves virtually no mandatory terms to be
controlled by the legislature. Such a statute now gives other states
the incentive to offer competing statutes so as not to lose franchise
revenue.
The proliferation of noncorporate statutory forms like the Dela-
ware business trust statute and limited liability company statutes
that include few mandatory governance rules sets the stage for a test
of the viability of the filing requirement. Courts may be persuaded
to enforce nonfiled contracts absent any showing of efficiency rea-
sons for the filing requirement. This would be similar to judicial
recognition of private ordering in the close corporation following
adoption of special close corporation legislation.2"' Thus, the busi-
ness trust and limited liability company statutes may be intermediate
steps on the road to full recognition of private ordering, just as spe-
cial chartering was an intermediate step toward the development of
general incorporation statutes.20 6
G. Summary
This Part has shown that the law widely recognizes limited lia-
bility without incorporation. The consensus of many courts that
limited liability contracts should be enforced supports the norma-
tive conclusions in Parts II and III. The only significant departure
from enforceability is the statutory prohibition of corporations-by-
estoppel. These provisions have limited applicability, and can be
explained as an attempt to preserve a shred of the state-privilege
approach to incorporation. Increasing common law recognition of
noncorporate limited liability firms is breaking down legislative con-
trol over corporate features. The recent Delaware business trust
204. For a discussion ofjudicial recognition of contracts providing for corporate fea-
tures other than limited liability, see supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. Judicial
recognition of private limited liability contracts is discussed supra at subparts IV(A) - (D).
205. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of the history of the change in method of incorporation from
special chartering to general incorporation statutes, see generally Butler, England, supra
note 15.
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statute demonstrates that the states are approaching full-fledged
recognition of the contract theory of the corporation.
V. LIMITED LIABILrrY AND INVOLUNTARY CREDITORS
Thus far, the discussion has assumed that the creditor volunta-
rily contracts with the corporation. This Part discusses limited lia-
bility with respect to involuntary creditors. It shows that limited
liability in this situation, while obviously not the product of a con-
tract with the creditor, is also not a state-conferred privilege. Sub-
part A discusses pure involuntary "tort" creditors such as taxi
passengers and product consumers. Subpart B deals with "quasi-
involuntary" creditors who technically have dealt with the firm but
arguably have not bargained for limited liability.
A. Pure Involuntary Creditors
Suppose T 1 is hit by a speeding truck. The driver, A, is negli-
gent and clearly is the "servant" of P'.I07 By the law of agency, P,
would be liable to T, and would have to use her personal assets to
satisfy T's claim.2 °s But if T' is hit under identical circumstances
except that P 2 has incorporated his business, T' can claim only
against the (perhaps minimal) assets of P2 's corporation.
P 2 seems to be the beneficiary of a state-conferred privilege of
incorporation. But the following discussion shows that, as with re-
strictions on limited liability to contract creditors, the incorporation
requirement in the tort context is merely a means to preserve the
state's monopoly over corporate features.
First, the state filing is inconsequential to tort creditors. The
filing does not ensure that the firm has adopted creditor-protection
provisions, 209 and any disclosures resulting from the filing are use-
less to tort victims.
Second, there are efficiency reasons why the law should recog-
nize limited liability to tort creditors solely on the basis of formation
of a limited liability business even without a state filing. By virtue of
taking on the status of a limited liability firm, the company must pay
higher credit costs or undertake monitoring of its activities, or both,
as a result of the firm's dealings with voluntary investors. This
207. This means that A's physical conduct is subject to P's control or right of control,
as distinguished from the more general power of control sufficient to create an agency.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958) (distinguishing "servant" and "in-
dependent contractor").
208. See id. § 219 (liability of master for torts of servant).
209. See supra subpart III(B).
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shows that tort risk will be sufficiently internalized that the benefits
of limited liability outweigh its costs to involuntary creditors. In
other words, it is the contractual relationship within the firm, and
not the state filing, that justifies not holding the owners liable for
torts.
Third, the law widely recognizes limited liability in informal
noncorporate contractual relationships. An important example is
the rule that principals are not liable for the torts of their agents
who are "independent contractors" rather than "servants. 21 ° The
independent contractor exception to tort liability rests not only on
the substantive aspects of the degree or kind of control exercised by
the principal, but also on a case-by-case review of the details of the
contract between the principal and the independent contractor, in-
cluding whether the agent has a "distinct occupation or business,"
the "method of payment, whether by the time or by the job," and
"whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation-
ship of master and servant." 21 ' In other words, the structure of the
private contract among the parties to the firm is controlling. The
same reasoning would justify not extending tort liability to those
who have contracted among themselves to be members of limited
liability firms.
It is a separate question whether limited tort liability of corpo-
rate shareholders-with or without formal incorporation-is justifi-
able on efficiency grounds. The efficiency argument for limited tort
liability is that the benefits of limited liability discussed in Part II-
facilitating the development of an efficient market, separation of
management and control, and risk diversification-offset costs im-
posed on tort creditors.2 12 As suggested above, limited liability
firms can be expected to internalize tort risks to some extent. Vol-
untary creditors, managers who have made human capital invest-
ments, and owners have the incentive to minimize exposure of their
investments to liability risk by monitoring the use of these assets
and by insuring themselves (thereby delegating monitoring func-
tions to insurers).2 I3
On the other hand, letting firms select limited tort liability by
incorporating may be inefficient. Perhaps all limited tort liability
210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
211. Id.
212. In other words, there is arguably efficiency in the Kaldor-Hicks sense. The par-
ties in an "original position"-that is, not knowing whether they will be tort victims-
arguably would favor a rule in which society as a whole is better off.
213. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 107-09.
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should be abolished on the ground that parties to firms are in a bet-
ter position to insure than are potential tort victims. Maybe limited
liability should be denied to firms that adopt limited liability only
with respect to tort creditors or that have less than a minimal
amount of capitalization or insurance. Otherwise, owners of these
firms may have little incentive to insure or monitor. While some of
these firms are one-employee operations whose owners would be
personally liable for their own torts, many are not. The paradigm is
the taxi cab firm consisting of several one-or-two-cab corporations
all under common ownership.2 4 Finally, tort creditors might be ad-
equately protected by giving their claims super-priority in
bankruptcy. 21 5
The point here is not that tort claimants should not be pro-
tected, but rather that they gain nothing by requiring the cab-owner
to incorporate rather than simply to organize the business as a non-
statutory limited liability firm. Indeed, even under the current rule
that formal incorporation is a prerequisite to limited liability, tort
claimants are protected primarily by case law rules that enable them
to "pierce the veil" of formally incorporated firms.216
Thus, limited tort liability should be available without formal
incorporation. It should not be regarded as a state-conferred privi-
lege or as a basis for state regulation of corporate governance terms.
B. Quasi-Involuntary Creditors
Some creditors deal voluntarily with limited liability firms but
do not bargain for limited liability. The extreme case is the injured
taxi passenger who obviously did not negotiate credit terms on the
basis of the liability rules, and indeed often could not because taxi
fares normally are regulated. The characterization arguably extends
to product purchasers, short-term trade creditors, and unsophistica-
ted employees.
The argument for distinguishing creditors on the basis of their
214. See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 223 N.E.2d 6, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585
(1966).
215. See Buckley, supra note 99, at 1415-19.
216. Even these rules provide little protection for tort creditors. In Walkovszky, the
court refused to "pierce the veil" on the basis only of allegations of inadequate capitali-
zation. 18 N.Y.2d at 420, 223 N.E.2d at 10, 276 N.Y.S.2d at 590. In the few cases in
which the courts did pierce the veil on this ground, the corporation was arguably a com-
plete sham. See, e.g., Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage Co., 178 Okla. 15, 61
P.2d 645 (1936) (veil pierced because corporation organized for purpose of operating a
taxicab business which was found to be the "mere instrumentality" of an older corpora-
tion). Id. at 649.
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sophistication or the quality of their dealings with the firm is weak
for policy reasons. The uninformed or unsophisticated creditor is
as likely to overvalue as to undervalue the risk, and this gives the
firm an incentive to reduce the creditors' information or negotiation
costs. If the argument is based on the creditor's bargaining posi-
tion, the question is whether this situation differs from others in
which the courts have enforced the bargain despite claims of
"unconscionability."
The important point for present purposes, though, is not
whether the contract should be enforced, but that recognizing lim-
ited liability in this situation should be regarded as a matter of con-
tract rather than state privilege. Requiring formal incorporation
does not affect the supposed plight of the nonbargaining creditor.
Indeed, the creditor's bargaining position has been an important
factor in veil-piercing cases where the firm did formally in-
corporate.217
CONCLUSION
Limited liability should be regarded as a product of private
agreements, and not a state-conferred privilege. Private contracts
for limited liability should be enforced in closely as well as publicly
held firms and without regard to whether the parties have complied
with a filing requirement. This has been recognized by many courts
in a wide variety of circumstances. Understanding the contractual
nature of limited liability is the last important step toward full recog-
nition of the contractual nature of the corporation. With this under-
standing, the corporate contract can be analyzed like other contracts
and not subjected to special regulatory burdens.
217. See Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 459 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 599
F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1979); Bendix Home Sys., Inc., v. Hurston Enters., Inc., 566 F.2d 1039
(5th Cir. 1978); Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, 309 N.Y. 103, 127 N.E.2d 832
(1955); Angus v. Air Coils, Inc. 567 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Hanson South-
west Corp. v. Dal-Mac Constr. Co., 554 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977)
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